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PAYMENTS DATA SECURITY BREACHES AND
OIL SPILLS: WHAT LESSONS CAN PAYMENTS
SECURITY LEARN FROM THE LAWS
GOVERNING REMEDIATION OF THE EXXON
VALDEZ, DEEPWATER HORIZON, AND
OTHER OIL SPILLS?
Sarah Jane Hughes
Legal regimes for remediating defects and certain accidents range from
strict liability in tort to warranty enforcement litigation to international
treaties and conventions with explicit, pre-ordained compensation limits
and procedures. Although to date no over-arching legal regime has
governed data security defects and breaches in the United States or
elsewhere, data security breaches are as capable of inflicting externalities
on counter-parties and consumers as the types of defects and accidents that
are covered by such schemes.1


Copyright © 2010. Sarah Jane Hughes. All rights Reserved. Sarah Jane Hughes is the
University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law at the Maurer School of Law, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Indiana. Professor Hughes would like to thank Professor Edward (Ted)
Janger and Brooklyn Law School for the invitation to present this Article as part of the Data
Security and Data Privacy in the Payment System Symposium, Dean Lauren Robel and the
Maurer School for research support for it, and the other participants in this Symposium, the
faculty of Brooklyn Law School, and the editors of the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial
& Commercial Law for their helpful comments and camaraderie. I also thank Fred H. Cate,
Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research,
Indiana University, Roland L. Trope, and Stephen T. Middlebrook for conversations about aspects
of this Article; Professor Edward Robertson of the Indiana University School of Informatics for
assistance with the concept of how an analogy to a double-hulled vessel would work in the field of
data security; and John P. Lowrey and Sean P. Giambattista, Maurer School of Law Classes of
2010 and 2011, respectively, for research assistance. Special thanks go to Professor Frank
Pasquale, Lofton Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School, for his helpful commentary on the
Symposium draft of this Article. His references to earlier e-commerce scholarship, including
articles such as Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation
Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1 (2006), which drew upon more traditional
environmental law analogies, enlivened discussion at the Symposium, and his historical
perspective persuaded me to try to make the connection between the maritime-environmental law
solutions and possible approaches to payments data security more clearly. Despite all of this
talented help, all mistakes here are my own.
This Article is dedicated to dear friends, Inez Janger, who coincidentally is Ted Janger’s
mother, and the late Peter Ghee. Ms. Janger’s experience and extraordinary common sense have
helped steer a unique non-profit organization successfully through very stormy seas that have had
nothing to do with data security or oil spills. Mr. Ghee’s long career in the oil industry, shipping
and maritime law and his acumen and foresight helped bring about the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which is known as MARPOL 73/78 and my
acquaintance with it, which I discuss in this Article.
Research for this Article ended on August 2, 2010, which was the 105th day after the
explosion on the BP Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and subsequent oil spill into the Gulf of
Mexico.
1. See Chris J. Hoofnagle, Internalizing Identity Theft, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 29–34
(2009).
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When I began thinking about a paper for this Symposium, I was struck
by the similarities and differences between data security breaches and
maritime accidents, at least in terms of their substantial consequential and
incidental damages. In payments data security, these damages include card
cancellation and replacement expenses, database clean-up expenses,
counter-party and customer business relation expenses, reputational injuries
(including loss of customers and market capitalization to business counterparties), and the risk of identity theft, damage to credit ratings, lost credit
opportunities, and emotional distress to card or account holders.2 In the
maritime and exploration industries, these damages include damage to the
environment, shore and sea life, and livelihoods.3
In particular, I began wondering about whether pollution and seaworthiness analogies might exist between famous payments data security
breaches—that Professors Edward Janger, one of our hosts, and Paul
Schwartz, a faculty alumnus of Brooklyn Law School, called “data
spills”4—such as TJX,5 Hannaford Brothers,6 and Heartland Payments,
Inc.,7 and famous maritime accidents such as the Torrey Canyon wreck,8 the
Exxon Valdez grounding,9 and the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion.10 This
line of inquiry also led me to the 1973 and 1978 international conventions
that were drafted in response to Torrey Canyon,11 and to ponder whether the

2. See United States v. Karro, 257 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the human cost of
identity theft, including emotional costs).
3. See Joe Stephens, The Valdez’s Unheeded Lessons; BP was Part of Alaska Response, but
Decades Later Same Problems Persist, WASH. POST, July 14, 2010, at A1.
4. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Agency Announces Settlement of Separate
Actions Against Retailer TJX, and Data Brokers Reed Elsevier and Seisint for Failing to Provide
Adequate Security for Consumers’ Data (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/03/data
sec.shtm [hereinafter Settlement of Separate Actions].
6. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.
Me. 2009).
7. See Linda McGlasson, Heartland, Visa Announce $60 Million Settlement Funds Would
Reimburse Card Issuers for Breach-Related Losses, BANKINFOSECURITY (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=2054.
8. See In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The Torrey Canyon,
an oil tanker carrying more than 119,000 tons of oil from the Persian Gulf to Wales, was stranded
on the rocks off the southwestern coast of England, causing the Torrey Canyon’s oil tanks to
rupture and discharge oil into the Atlantic, polluting both shorelines of the English Channel. See
id. at 229. The British Royal Air Force eventually bombed the Torrey Canyon, destroying the ship
and leading to a total loss of its cargo. Id.
9. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). The Exxon Valdez, a
“supertanker” carrying 53 million gallons of oil from Alaska to the lower 48 states, “grounded on
Bligh Reef off the Alaskan coast,” causing the discharge of millions of gallons of crude oil into
Prince William Sound after the ship’s hull fractured. Id. at 2611–13.
10. See Campbell Robertson, 11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana; 17 are
Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at A13.
11. See Background on Pollution Prevention and MARPOL 73/78, INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/
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core teachings of those conventions might help frame approaches for data
security breach prevention, clean-up, and liability.
Just as Professor Juliet M. Moringiello’s Article for this Symposium
harks back to property law and common law warranties to suggest an
approach for more contemporary payments data security breaches,12 I
recognize that data spills are newer phenomena than maritime accidents and
oil spills. Thus, in searching for approaches to these problems, I, too,
looked backwards—but to different sources of law. However, like accidents
involving discharges of oil and other pollutants at sea, such as Exxon
Valdez, and incidents involving problems with oil and gas exploration, such
as Deepwater Horizon, data security breach remediation may require the
development of laws, treaties, and conventions to govern these types of
accidents.
Of course, at the March 19, 2010 Symposium at Brooklyn Law School,
we had no idea that only a month later one of the most devastating oil spills
in U.S. history would occur. The events surrounding the April 20, 2010
explosion on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform in the Gulf of
Mexico will be featured prominently in our discussions of energy policy,
environmental policy, and general disaster management for decades,13 just
as the data security breaches at TJX, RBS WorldPay, and Heartland will in
future discussions of data security policy.
The WellPoint data breach—disclosed in June, 201014—and Hannaford
highlight additional concerns with payments data risk management and data
governance that had not been the focus of the Symposium draft of this
Article. These concerns include a lack of coordinated rapid-fire response
capacities and delays in sharing information about breaches with affected
constituencies—including merchant banks and customers—that need it
most.15 Similarly, Deepwater Horizon confirmed that we still lacked
sufficient rapid-fire disaster relief capability for natural disasters than was
evident following Hurricane Katrina or Exxon Valdez.16 In both data and
natural disasters, we depend on private risk determinations pre- and postaccidents and largely private efforts to manage critical pieces of the
recovery processes. The incentives of the companies that bear the largest
OilPollution/Pages/Background.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2010); see also International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, concluded Nov. 2, 1973, 1340
U.N.T.S 184, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 1340, as modified by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, concluded Feb. 17, 1978, 1340
U.N.T.S 61, 17 I.L.M. 146 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78].
12. Juliet Moringiello, Warranting Data Security, 5 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 63
(2010).
13. See Stephens, supra note 3.
14. See Steve Ragan, WellPoint: Data Breach Caused by Attorneys and Faulty Security
Update, TECH. HERALD (June 29, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/
201026/5807/WellPoint-Data-breach-caused-by-attorneys-and-faulty-security-update.
15. Id.
16. See Stephens, supra note 3.
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responsibility for oil spills are similar to the incentives of private payments
systems and users that report payments data security breaches to authorities,
and their nearly exclusive role in remedying the damages to others affected
by payments data breaches.17 Thus, we are all hostages in a sense to private
decision-making in the prevention and remediation of certain events and to
the rigorous cost-cutting that has typified business practice in the United
States.18 In addition, pending criminal investigations (or even the prospect
of them) generally delay access to critical information about culpability. It
often is some time before we can know the full details about accidents—
whether oil spills or shipping mishaps, or data security breaches—and these
delays themselves may slow the process of crafting appropriate protections
and remediation schemes for the specific incidents and applying the lessons
learned from each going forward.
The totality of ship and drilling accidents—of which, federal records
suggest, a “handful” occurred in the Gulf of Mexico annually from 1964 to
2009,19—also sent me thinking beyond the negligent or criminal data
security breach events that occupied most of my thinking prior to the
Symposium. Broader transnational crimes, national security threats, and
disaster management concerns present themselves in the payments data
arena almost as starkly as in the maritime and environmental accidents
arena.20
Much has been written about payments data security breaches and the
damages they can impose on consumers who are victims.21 Perhaps just as
much has been written about various state laws and federal proposals that
require providers to notify consumers when their personally identifiable
information has been lost.22 The quality of these articles leaves me free to
17. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 4, at 919.
18. See Stephens, supra note 3; see also Hoofnagle, supra note 1, at 33.
19. Steven Mufson, Since ‘64, A Steady Stream of Oil Spills Has Tainted Gulf, WASH. POST,
July 24, 2010, at A1.
20. In the days following the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, the Federal Reserve System put
hundreds of millions of dollars of liquidity into the U.S. banking system in order to keep the
economy running. James J. McAndrews & Simon M. Potter, Liquidity Effects of the Events of
September 11, 2001, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Nov. 2002, at 59, available
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/02v08n2/0211mcan.pdf. The Federal Reserve lent
billions of dollars through the discount window, more than 200 times the daily average amount of
lending in the prior month, and temporarily waived daylight overdraft fees and overnight overdraft
penalties. Id. at 69–70.
21. E.g., J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 121–23 (2008); Chris J. Hoofnagle,
Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97, 98 (2007); Joel
R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2003); Schwartz &
Janger, supra note 4.
22. See, e.g., Janine S. Hiller, David L. Baumer & Wade M. Chumney, Due Diligence on the
Run: Business Lessons Derived from FTC Actions to Enforce Core Security Principles, 45 IDAHO
L. REV. 283, 285–88, 305–08 (2009) (discussing international, federal, and state laws regarding
hacking and privacy, and the application of legal principles to enhance consumer privacy); Bruce
A. Colbath, Customer Privacy & Data Security: The Importance of Guarding Your Hen-House,
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pursue other issues here; which, of course, does not suggest that I could
handle them as well as their authors did.
But relatively less has been written about the “direct and indirect”
damages and “opportunity costs” that payments systems participants suffer
because of data spills.23 These businesses normally are not the targets or
entry points of data security breaches, but rather sustain forms of collateral
“pollution” from those data security “spills”24 much like maritime accidents
pollute physical and environmental assets. These payment systems
participants include entities upstream from a data security breach, as well as
others on its periphery.25 To complicate recovery of collateral costs borne in
these cases, contractual disclaimers for third-party losses dominate in the
major agreements governing the operation of the credit card systems.26
They are less common in wire transfer bank-customer agreements because
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)’s Article 4A regime requires an
explicit agreement to pay consequential damages and also limits—to the
extent allowed by Section 4A-305—the opportunity to vary the liability of
the receiving bank by agreement.27
Data security in payments takes on a new urgency in light of reports
about recent mass-scale hackings—including the hacking into Google
Gmail accounts by the People’s Republic of China28—reports that
individuals based in China are hacking into commercial databases,29 and
reports about the increasing scope of criminal hacking episodes.30 The
60 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 603, 607 (2006) (discussing state statutes enacted in the wake of the
Choicepoint data breach).
23. For an example of specific research addressing these issues, see PONEMON INSTITUTE,
2008 ANNUAL STUDY: COST OF A DATA BREACH (2009), available at
http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/Ponemon_COB_2008_US_090201.pdf.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See VISA, RULES FOR VISA MERCHANTS: CARD ACCEPTANCE AND CHARGEBACK
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 60 (2007), available at http://www.emscard.com/uploads/Documents
/rules_for_visa_merchants.pdf.
27. U.C.C. § 4A-305 (2001). Of course, UCC Article 4A also sets forth a series of rules that
are designed to allow the receiving bank to identify erroneous payment orders by reliance on
specific arrangements in the security procedure agreed to by the sender and its receiving bank.
E.g., id. § 4A-205 (2001). The sender also has a duty to discover and report errors in orders
accepted by the receiving bank. Id. § 4A-205(b). In addition, in connection with a claim for
liability for late or improper execution or failure to execute payment orders, § 4A-305(a) of the
U.C.C. limits damages to those payable under subsections (a) and (b). Other damages, including
consequential damages, are recoverable to the extent provided in an express written agreement of
the receiving bank. Id. § 4A-305(c)–(d).
28. See, e.g., A New Approach to China, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 3:00
PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html.
29. Mike Harvey, China Raid on Google ‘Also Hit Global Industrial Targets’; Hackers
Installed ‘Back Door’ to Gain Control of Computers, TIMES (UK), Jan. 16, 2010, at 15.
30. Id. In contrast, the combined number of data security breaches reported by government and
military agencies in the United States fell in 2009 compared with 2008, but the number of records
affected was larger. Hilton Collins, Many More Government Records Compromised in 2009 than
TECH.
(Dec.
2,
2009),
Year
Ago,
Report
Claims,
GOV’T
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cross-border aspects of such breaches add to this urgency,31 particularly
because they make business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer
(B2C) compensation more complicated.32 Additional concerns emerge from
the prospect of strategic hacking incidents, including the lack of apparent
well-coordinated disaster response and management capacity, and the
continued reliance on private actors to prevent, report, and respond to data
security breaches.33
We also must confront the fact that many cyber-breaches are never
publicized to persons whose information may have spilled or to law
enforcement.34 In some cases, even incidents that are publicized in news
media may not be revealed with particularity to customers. For example,
following Heartland, my family received new credit cards in the mail with
new account numbers and no explanation whatsoever from the card issuers
of why they suddenly were replacing cards that had not expired. In early
2010, I received a new set of American Express cards bearing the same
expiration date also with no explanation; concerned, I called the company
and learned that the replacements were part of its private remediation of a
former employee’s theft of hard drives containing many thousands of
cardholders’ personal information that had been detected nine months prior.
Apparently to reassure me, the company’s representative told me that the
perpetrator was now cooperating with the recovery efforts and that my
account data had only recently been identified as having been affected by
the theft.

http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/734214 (discussing a report by the Identity Theft Resource
Center that the number of breaches reported up to December 2009 was 82 compared with 110 for
all of 2008 but that the number of records affected soared from less than three million to more
than 79 million). The report apparently called for greater vigilance in securing data, including
“when it’s mobile.” Id. The article also cited 461 separate data breaches in “all sectors” affecting
222 million records, as opposed to a total of 656 breaches in 2008 that affected “more than 35
million compromised records.” Id.
31. William Resnik et al., Wave of Online Banking Fraud Targeting Businesses, K&L GATES
NEWSSTAND (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/detail.aspx?publication=6209
(explaining the growing theft and misuse of user names and passwords to online banking accounts
and use of fraudulent wire transfers and automated clearing house (ACH) transfers to foreign
countries).
32. See id. The terms “B2B” and “B2C” refer, respectively, to business-to-business and
business-to-consumer transactions in e-commerce and e-payments. See, e.g., Jane K. Winn,
Consumers and Standard Setting in Electronic Payments Regulation, 5 ELEC. BANKING L. &
COM. REP. 11, 15 (2002); Robert Kossick, The Internet in Latin America: New Opportunities,
Developments, & Challenges, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2001).
33. See Ellen Nakashima, War Game Reveals U.S. Lacks Cyber-Crisis Skills; Staged
Emergency Displays Need for Strategy, Organizers Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, at A3
(covering the February 2010 “Cyber Shock Wave” simulation conducted in Washington, D.C.).
34. See Diane Bartz & Jim Finkle, Cyber Breaches Are a Closely Kept Secret, REUTERS, Nov.
24, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AN4YH20091124 (detailing the
reluctance of companies that are victims of breaches to disclose them because of fear of
reputational damage, loss of customers, injury to profits, and criminal attention shifting to smaller
and medium-sized firms whose data is less well protected).
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Finally, in a reminder that seemingly ordinary burglaries may cause
massive expenses and potential liability, on March 1, 2010, a report
emerged about an October 2, 2009 burglary of fifty-seven hard drives from
a closet at a BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee training facility.35 These
hard drives apparently contained unencrypted data from more than one
million customer support calls and 300,000 “screen shots” of computer
monitors made contemporaneously with the support calls; most of the calls
and many screen shots revealed sensitive personal information that is used
in identity theft, according to the report.36
The Ponemon Institute’s annual report on data breach costs suggests
that the overwhelming percentage of breaches is attributable to negligence
by insiders.37 Negligence in the handling of sensitive personal information
in transmission or storage is not dissimilar from the captain’s absence from
the bridge as the Exxon Valdez approached the reefs in Prince William
Sound, Alaska with an inebriated harbor pilot at the controls,38 or the series
of “risk-based decisions” that BP apparently made in the management of
the drilling process at the Deepwater Horizon facility and for which
government investigators tentatively concluded that the operators chose the
“least expensive option even though it potentially elevated the risk.”39 So,
in the prevention of oil spills, one commentator observed the lessons we
ought to have learned from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez went
“unheeded” too long.40 The same may be said of data spills because of the
slow pace of U.S. card security to adopt Europay, MasterCard, and Visa
(EVM) security, and this may involve risk assessments that opt for less
expensive technologies over those that offer greater security for data.41

35. Robert McMillan, Data Theft Creates Notification Nightmare for BlueCross, PCWORLD
(Mar. 1, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/190461/data_theft_
creates_notification_nightmare_for_bluecross.html [hereinafter McMillan, Data Theft].
36. Id. (detailing more than five months of work including notification of more than 300,000
customers so far and expenses of more than $7 million).
37. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 7.
38. See Stephens, supra note 3. For more detailed information about the Exxon Valdez
grounding, oil spill, and its causes, see ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, SPILL: THE WRECK OF
THE EXXON VALDEZ, IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFE TRANSPORT OF OIL (1990), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/oil-spill/docs/alaska-commission-report.pdf.
39. Joel Achenbach & David Hilzenrath, From Series of Missteps to Calamity in the Gulf;
Investigators Believe that BP Cut Corners, WASH. POST, July 25, 2010, at A1.
40. Stephens, supra note 3 (reporting on BP predecessor British Petroleum’s “central role” in
the Exxon Valdez incident and pointing a finger at cost-cutting to maximize profits and regulators
“too close to the oil industry” that “approved woefully inadequate accident response and cleanup
plans”). Stephens also described comments made by the Chairman of the former Alaska Oil Spill
Commission, Walt Parker, including “‘[i]t’s almost as though we had never written the report [on
the Exxon Valdez].’” Id.
41. Kate Fitzgerald, Fraud Could Come from North After Canada Phases in EMV, AM.
BANKER, July 14, 2010, at 6 (citing a prediction by Christopher Justice, the president for North
America of the French payment terminal maker Ingenico S.A., that “‘fraudsters specializing in
magnetic stripes will begin to focus more heavily on the U.S. as Canada moves away from mag-
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This Article suggests sources of law for an institutional framework that
would create stronger incentives for the prevention of payments data
breaches and for their prompt remediation, including a requirement for
compulsory notice to a central agency regardless of the number of
individuals or records involved. It does not advocate compulsory notice to
consumers whose rights may be affected by a cyber-security breach, and
instead recommends that the central agency—whether domestic or
international—decide whether notifying consumers whose accounts might
be affected is warranted. The Article also considers whether our current
means of redressing losses through payments system rules and litigation is
preferable to possible federal schemes like the oil liability provisions of the
Clean Water Act,42 and the liability provisions of the Oil Pollution Act
(OPA) of 1990.43 The former established strict liability civil penalties and
significantly higher civil penalties for cases involving gross negligence.44
The latter establishes a liability framework that increases incentives for
prevention by limiting damages to removal costs and maximum damages
unless the oil spill incident was caused by the gross negligence or willful
misconduct of the responsible party or the failure or refusal of the
responsible party or its counter-parties to report the incident.45 If the
liability limits are too low, the tendency will be either to devote too few
resources to prevention, or to fail to report or underreport the severity of the
spill, as may have happened in Deepwater Horizon.46 Incomplete or delayed
notice requirements in the data spills hinder remediation and may contribute
to broader complications, including threats to larger payments systems and
critical infrastructure. Reporting delays or incomplete reporting would
particularly complicate the remediation of malicious attacks or strategic
behavior designed to cripple part or all of the domestic payments systems.
Part I of this Article briefly describes what government agencies, think
tanks, and the media have reported about recent high-profile data spills
affecting payments systems, and particularly the prospects of large-scale
criminal and even strategic cyber-security threats.47 Part II describes the
stripe’” and also that converting “back-office and software . . . to switch from mag-stripe card
would cost billions” as an explanation of the slower pace of EMV adoption here).
42. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1321 (2006).
43. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2704 (2006).
44. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A) (strict liability civil penalty), with 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(7)(D) (significantly higher civil penalty for cases involving gross negligence). However, neither
penalty was sufficiently large to deter the cost-cutting and low-balled risk assessments that
allegedly led to the Deepwater Horizon explosion.
45. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (maximum liability and removal costs for offshore
facilities is “the total of all removal costs plus $75,000,000”), with 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)–(2) (the
prior limit is inapplicable if the incident is proximately caused by gross negligence or willful
misconduct, or involves a violation of a federal safety, construction, or operating regulation, or if
the responsible party does not report the incident).
46. See Mufson, supra note 19.
47. See Nakashima, supra note 33.
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origins of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto,
collectively known as MARPOL 73/78,48 in major pollution events
associated with maritime accidents and particularly the Convention’s
requirements for the prevention of pollution. It also describes the federal
Clean Water Act, which prescribes rules for spills from pipelines as well as
oil wells,49 and the OPA, which prescribes special rules for off-shore
facilities and deepwater ports spill liability.50 Part III compares the
requirements and remedies that MARPOL and the OPA offer with those
available for the prevention of data security breaches. Part IV evaluates
recently passed and introduced bills focused on data security breaches and
cyber-security problems generally. It also briefly discusses recent state
legislation relating to data security breaches. Part V asks whether “safe
harbor” provisions in legislation might result in reduced prevention and less
effective care to recover from data spills rather than more. Part VI sets forth
conclusions.
I. PAYMENTS DATA SECURITY BREACHES/DATA SPILLS
Like maritime or oil exploration accidents discharging oil or other
pollutants, data security breaches come in many sizes.51 However, unlike
the provisions of the OPA that specifically allow removal costs incurred in
connection with oil spills into the navigable waters, adjoining waters, or the
exclusive economic zone of the United States,52 there is no comparable
federal liability scheme for data spills. Accordingly, prevention plans and
remediation efforts have largely been left to private actors in the data spill
arena.53 For example, the federal “Safeguards Rule” implementing Section
501 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) Privacy provisions,54 and the
Disposal and Red Flags Rules implementing the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA)55 that apply to providers of consumer
financial products and services, reflect legislative and regulatory
preferences for self-assessments of risks and for implementation by private
48.
49.
50.
51.

MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11.
33 U.S.C. § 1321.
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006).
Mark Jewell, TJX Breach Could Top 94 Million Accounts, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 24, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21454847.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)–(b)(1).
53. See, e.g., Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484, 36,484
(May 23, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 314).
54. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2010). § 501
privacy provisions that are the underlying authority for the Safeguards Rule are codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006).
55. Duties Regarding the Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation of Identity Theft, 16 C.F.R. §
681.2 (2006); Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records, 16 C.F.R. § 682 (2006).
See also Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117
Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681).
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actors of policies and procedures that match these self-assessments.56 State
laws also leave to private actors the ability to own or license personal
information about their customers, and implement and maintain “reasonable
security procedures and practices,” but require these procedures and
practices to be “appropriate to the nature of the information” to protect it
from “access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”57 Thus,
incentives exist for low-balling risk in order to reduce the costs associated
with prevention of data security breaches, just as it appears that low-balled
or ignored risks contributed to the well explosion and subsequent inability
to control the oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon well.58
The next portion of this Article examines recent data spills and their
remediation costs. These examples reflect different types of spills—some
negligent and some presumptively criminal or malicious—and their effects
in terms of unauthorized access to account information or loss of funds by
some affected parties.
A. RECENT SPILLS INVOLVING PAYMENTS DATA
Four recent examples suggest that substantial damages may result from
payments data breaches. These examples represent different problems that
payments systems participants have with data security, including B2B
liability and B2C liability, as well as qualifications to participate in
payment systems.
1. WellPoint
WellPoint, Inc. (WellPoint) is the nation’s largest health insurer with a
customer base of more than 30 million.59 It apparently experienced a data
breach in October 2009, as the result of a failed security update.60 WellPoint
reports that the breach “could have exposed personal information,”
including medical history and payment information, “belonging to 470,000
customers.”61 WellPoint did not learn about the breach until it received a
subpoena the following March.62 The company attributed some
unauthorized access to manipulation by attorneys representing an applicant

56. See, e.g., Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. at 36,484 (final
rule requires financial institutions to develop written information security programs appropriate to
the size and complexity of their operation, the nature and scope of activities in which they engage,
and the sensitivity of the customer information they obtain, and also that “certain basis elements”
be included to “ensure that it addresses the relevant aspects of the financial institution’s operations
and that it keeps pace with developments that may have a material impact on its safeguards”).
57. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (Deering 2009).
58. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39.
59. See Ragan, supra note 14.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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for insurance.63 It had notified 470,000 customers—including 230,000 in
California alone—by June 29, 2010, and had undertaken other remediation
measures. WellPoint continued to access its options for the recovery of its
expenses and data as it remains unclear precisely who or how many
unauthorized persons gained access to the records.64
2. Royal Bank of Scotland
Data spills affecting the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) are a reminder
that not all payments data spills target U.S. providers or consumers in the
U.S. RBS has had more than one payments data security breach. In 2008,
the company—along with American Express and UK-based NatWest
Bank—lost data contained on a server that was sold on eBay for the
equivalent of $64; the server apparently contained unencrypted back-up
data “includ[ing] names, addresses, bank account numbers, telephone
numbers and customer signatures.”65
On November 8, 2008, RBS WorldPay experienced widespread fraud
as a result of another data breach.66 The data breach had occurred earlier
when unauthorized individuals accessed the information.67 This time, RBS
lost $9 million when thieves used ATMs in forty-nine cities around the
world to gain the cash after penetrating RBS WorldPay servers.68 After
stealing encrypted data from payroll cards and the associated PINs, some
members of the group also allegedly accessed the RBS WorldPay network
and raised the applicable limits on the cards as well as limits on what could
be withdrawn at ATMs with the cards.69 Following that breach, Visa
stripped RBS of its status as a validated service provider, but by May 22,
2009, it had restored RBS’ status as a Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS) validated service provider.70
3. Helsinki, Finland Merchant
A second case concerning a non-U.S. owner of data involved a
Helsinki, Finland merchant who reported that data from more than 100,000
payment cards had been stolen from the merchant’s server; of these, 40,000
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Tom Espiner, Amex, Royal Bank of Scotland, NatWest Customer Details Sold on eBay,
CNET NEWS (Aug. 26, 2008, 10:57 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10026032-83.html.
66. Robert Lemos, Data-Breach Lawsuit Follows $9 Million Heist, SECURITYFOCUS (Feb. 6,
2009), http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/903.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. RBS WorldPay Indictment Outlines Sophisticated Hacker Coordination, DIGITAL
TRANSACTIONS (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/index.php/news/story/2371.
70. Warwick Ashford, RBS WorldPay Regains Security Approval After Data Breach,
COMPUTERWEEKLY (May 22, 2009, 9:25 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/
05/22/236142/RBS-WorldPay-regains-security-approval-after-data-breach.htm.
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were active cards.71 The Helsinki Criminal Police’s Information
Technology Crimes Unit reported that: (a) the attacks on the merchant’s
servers were traced to internet protocol addresses in Romania and the
United States although they were uncertain that the attacks originated in
either country; (b) the data breach occurred in mid-January, but involved
payment cards from 2005 to January 2010—as many as three-fifths of
which may have expired; (c) a routine computer security check uncovered
the breach; and (d) the merchant has removed the vulnerable system from
use and has replaced it with the newer-age, less vulnerable EMV system.72
The merchant had decided to notify only those domestic and foreign
cardholders whose cards have been fraudulently used.73 Finland’s largest
credit card services company, Luottokunta, noted that because Finnish
merchants use the PCI DSS, advanced monitoring, and card shutdown
systems, the level of payment card abuses was “half” the rate experienced
in other countries.74
4. P2P File Sharing (Unnamed Victims or Potential Victims).
A fourth type of data spill apparently involves person-to-person (P2P)
file sharing at almost 100 organizations, as reported by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in February 2010. The details about these data spills are
vague, but the FTC’s press release makes it clear that file sharing software
enabled the transmission of personally identifiable and account information
otherwise available on the computer on which the file-sharing programs
were run.75
B. WHAT DO PAYMENTS DATA SPILLS COST?
As the above data security breaches suggest, reported costs for data
security breaches have risen over the past few years. For example, the 2008
Annual Study: Cost of a Data Breach, issued in February 2009, reported
that “total annual costs” incurred in seventeen different industries rose to
“$202 per record compromised [in 2008], an increase of 2.5 percent since
2007 ($197 per record) and 11 percent [since] 2006 ($182 per record).”76
The same study reported that the largest cost increase involved “abnormal

71. Marcus Hoy, Data Security: Payment Card Data Theft from Merchant is Finland’s
Largest Card Breach, Police Say, 94 BNA BANKING REP. 443 (2010).
72. Id. An EMV system is a specialty security platform that Europay, MasterCard, and VISA
use outside the United States; it features chip-and-PIN technology. See CARDLOGIX, SMART
CARD & SECURITY BASICS 7 (2009), available at http://www.smartcardbasics.com/pdf/7100030_
BKL_Smart-Card-&-Security-Basics.
73. Hoy, supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Widespread Data Breaches Uncovered by FTC Probe
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/p2palert.shtm.
76. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 4.
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churn,” which indicates customer turnover.77 The report also noted that
healthcare and financial services companies that experienced data breaches
had the highest churn (customer defections) factors of 6.5 and 5.5 percent,
respectively, which the report attributed to both the sensitivity of the data
collected and customer expectations that information will be protected.78
Other factors in the overall costs of data spills identified in the
Ponemon Institute report include “outlays for detection, escalation,
notification, and after the fact (ex-post) response.”79 Companies that
experience data security breaches—like those that experience oil spills—
also suffer declines in their market capitalizations that can be significant.80
Evidence suggests that payments-related data spills cost an average of more
than $6.6 million.81 TJX reported losses of more than $1 billion in
connection with its 2006 breach,82 and direct remediation expenses of $256
million.83And, in addition, companies that suffer payments data spills often
experience significant declines in their capitalization in the period following
report of the breach.84
These significant declines in capitalization appear to be in addition to
the direct remediation costs reported above and costs associated with
enforcement actions and instituting and maintaining compliance plans. FTC
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera & Ronald D. White, BP Courts Mideast Investors; Increased
Stakes from the Region Could Hurt Its Image Further and Trigger U.S. Reviews, L.A. TIMES, July
8, 2010, at A1 (“Solvency has been a concern as BP’s stock value has plummeted as much as 55%
since oil started spewing from the Gulf of Mexico well in April.”).
Heartland Payments Systems, Inc. fared worse than TJX did in terms of market
capitalization gyrations after their data security incidents. Compare Jaikumar Vijayan, One Year
Later: Five Takeaways from the TJX Breach, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 17, 2008, 12:00PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9057758/One_year_later_Five_takeaways_from_the_TJ
X_breach (“Despite being the biggest, costliest and perhaps most written-about breach ever,
customer and investor confidence in TJX has remained largely unshaken. TJX’s stock was worth
about $30 per share when the breach was disclosed, and its closing price today was just over
$29.”), with Todd Wallack, Data Breach Ensnares Many in Mass.; Credit and Debit Card
Numbers Compromised, BOS. GLOBE, May 13, 2009, at B1 (“Heartland shares dropped sharply
after the company disclosed the breach Jan. 20. The company’s stock, which peaked at more than
$18 per share in early January, fell rapidly in the days after the disclosure, going as low as $4 in
March. It closed yesterday at $9.04.”). When seeing such a disparity one is tempted to ask, is this
disparity in investor reaction a measure of the likely differences between retailers that have goods
to sell to consumers and data processors that exist in a different, highly competitive market but
whose direct counter-parties are better able to move to another processor? Concerns over the
effects on local economies of the Deepwater Horizon spill have caused worries for banks. See
Rachel Witkowski, Equity Flows Out of Fla. As Oil Seeps in, AM. BANKER, July 15, 2010, at 1.
81. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 4. Data breaches such as the BlueCross BlueShield
of Tennessee breach are considered “more complex than a typical data breach,” and are likely to
cost more than the average amount. See McMillan, Data Theft, supra note 35.
82. Jeff Kress, Is Your Information Safe?, CA MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2008, at 44.
83. Ross Kerber, Cost of Data Breach at TJX Soars to $256m—Suits, Computer Fix Add to
Expenses, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 15, 2007, at A1.
84. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 4.
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enforcement actions involving violations of its financial privacy and
safeguards rules, or pursuant to its unfair or deceptive practices authority,
have required—in various combinations—civil penalties, consumer redress
payments, implementation of comprehensive data security programs, and
implementation of independent audits of compliance.85 For example,
ChoicePoint, Inc. (ChoicePoint) paid $10 million in civil penalties and $5
million in consumer redress to settle the FTC’s charges in 2006.86 In a May
2005 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, BJ’s estimated
that these claims were worth approximately $13 million.87 ChoicePoint also
was involved in a second enforcement action in 2009, for violations of its
2006 consent order.88 At the time BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. settled the
FTC’s charges, banks and credit unions were pursuing BJ’s to recover for
fraudulent payments and for damages associated with the cancellation and
re-issuance of credit and debit cards.89 The FTC consent order against
CardSystems Solutions—a third-party payment service provider charged
with violations of FTC Act Section 5’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices
authority—provides a good example of its requirements for new
comprehensive data security programs to protect the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of personal information that it collects or
receives from consumers by adopting administrative, technical, and

85. For a summary of FTC Section 5 enforcement actions involving financial privacy and data
security, see Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacy
initiatives/promises_enf.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). For an example of an FTC settlement
requiring implementation of a comprehensive information security program and long-term
independent audits, see Settlement of Separate Actions, supra note 5.
86. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; To
Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm. The violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
included failure to employ reasonable procedures to screen prospective clients for its specialized
credit reporting services and eventual disclosures of the personally identifiable information
pertaining to more than 160,000 customers when the clients to whom disclosures were made had
applications that raised red flags, including using commercial mail drops as business addresses,
using cell phone numbers as business telephone contact numbers, and paying for services using
money orders drawn on multiple issuers. See Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction,
and Other Equitable Relief at 5, 7, United States v. Choicepoint, Inc., No. 06-cv-0198 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf. The
FTC also charged that ChoicePoint in one case continued to provide consumer information after
ChoicePoint had suspended the customer for nonpayment on more than one occasion. Id. at 7.
87. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, BJ’s Wholesale Club Settles FTC Charges (June 16,
2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/bjwholesale.shtm [hereinafter BJ’s Wholesale Club Press
Release].
88. See Supplemental Stipulated Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary
Relief, United States v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 06-cv-0198-JTC (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint.shtm. ChoicePoint also is a recidivist like
BP. See id.
89. See BJ’s Wholesale Club Press Release, supra note 87. For the complaint and consent
order, see In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465 (2005).
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physical safeguards for personally identifiable information.90 Of course,
design and implementation of a new security program is a significant
expense.
II. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION GOVERNING NOTICE OF
AND COMPENSATION FOR MARITIME SPILLS OF OIL AND
OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
As mentioned above, there may be many parallels drawn between
payments data spills and pollution from maritime accidents. Both impose
costs on unsuspecting people that include huge risks of collateral damage to
livelihoods. Maritime accidents affect fisheries, shipping activities, and the
welfare of shore life. Businesses affected by data spills may experience a
fall in share values/market capitalization,91 exclusion from participation in
payment systems,92 and reputational damage. Individuals may experience
emotional distress, decreased credit ratings, and a loss of the privilege of
using credit rather than cash.
Both types of spills impose costs from long-term remediation efforts.
Indeed, reports suggest that TJX spent at least $256 million on recovery
efforts related to its data spill and that its overall losses were $1 billion.93
Exxon claims to have spent about $2 billion cleaning up the 11-milliongallon spill from the Exxon Valdez and another $1 billion to settle civil and
criminal charges against it.94 Consequential damage from the grounding to
sea life alone included the loss of 250,000 seabirds and more than 20 orca
whales.95 To compensate victims affected by Deepwater Horizon, BP has
established a fund in the range of $20 billion96 and spent more than $3
billion on the early stages of the clean-up and recovery.97 To deal with the
90. In re CardSystems Solutions, Inc., No. 052-3148, 2006 WL 515749 (F.T.C. Feb. 23,
2006). For more information about this and other FTC actions involving payments data security
breaches, see Martha L. Arias, Internet Law—Computer and Data Security Breaches, INTERNET
BUS. L. SERVS. (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.ibls.com/internet_law_news_portal_view.aspx?s=
latestnews&id=1852.
91. See Kimberly K. Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of “Carding”
Reveals, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 375 (2009).
92. E.g., Anthony M. Freed, Visa Puts Heartland on Probation Over Security Breach,
SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 13, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/125849-visa-puts-heartland-onprobation-over-security-breach (reporting the suspension of the Heartland system from VISA
participation until it had been recertified).
93. Peretti, supra note 91, at 380; Kerber, supra note 83.
94. See Jonathan Stempel, Special Report: BP Oil Spill a Gusher for Lawyers, REUTERS, Jun.
30, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65T2MZ20100630.
95. Dan Joling & Mark Thiessen, In Alaska, Painful Memories of Exxon Valdez,
CBSNEWS.COM, May 3, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/03/national/main6456
927.shtml.
96. Fiona Maharg-Bravo & Robert Cyran, Tallying BP’s Bill on the Gulf Coast, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2010, at B2.
97. Jad Mouawad, BP Begins Its Next Challenge: Reassuring Investors, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2010, at B1.
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consequences of these oil spills many conventions have been concluded.
Importantly, these conventions serve as useful comparisons for ways to deal
with data spills.
MARPOL 73/78 is the short-hand name for one such convention, the
1973 International Maritime Organization convention and a series of related
amendments, annexes, and protocols, including the 1978 and 1997
amendments to the convention.98 MARPOL 73/78 is not the only
convention dealing with the consequences of maritime collisions or with
certain forms of hazardous substance releases from sea-going ships.99 There
is also, for example, the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims.100 U.S. laws also govern incidents such as fatalities and oil spills.101
MARPOL has features that could serve as a template for a regime to
deal with data spills. It is a document with global force and, therefore, with
legitimacy, and it relies on governmental mechanisms, non-governmental
organizations, and—as one of its most attractive features for the purpose of
addressing data spills provides—its scheme relies on a diverse group called
“experts” to solve various technical, legal, and political problems that arise
under its provisions.102
MARPOL 73/78, the amendments to the 1978 Protocol and subsequent
regulations implementing the whole scheme, and U.S. laws implementing
the MARPOL scheme or other environmental protection requirements offer
four guiding points for a possible framework for payments data spills: (1)
the requirement of compulsory notice to a central agency;103 (2) a
compensation scheme that extends to third-parties affected by the hazardous
substance spills;104 (3) operational restrictions;105 and (4) the requirement to
outfit sea-going ships with double hulls or other alternative protections,
such as double bottoms, so as to protect against the accidental release of
98. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), INT’L
MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx (last visited Dec. 27,
2010).
99. E.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, concluded
May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OilPOL];
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, concluded Nov. 29, 1969,
973 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255.
100. Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, concluded Nov. 19, 1976,
1456 U.N.T.S. 221.
101. Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302–30308 (2006); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1321 (2006).
102. See Clay Maitland, Is MARPOL Dead?, MARINE LOG, Dec. 2007, at 52 (concluding that
MARPOL is not dead).
103. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11, at art. 8, ¶ 2(b). The 1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (Clean Water Act) requires notice of spills of hazardous substances, such as oil. 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5).
104. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11, at art. 7, ¶ 2.
105. Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, 1973, Resolution MEPC.117(52), adopted
Oct. 15, 2004, 2057 U.N.T.S. 68 [hereinafter Revised Annex 1 of MARPOL 73/78].
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hazardous substances in the ships.106 A fifth guiding principle of the oil spill
prevention scheme—the creation of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) as an international organization focused on the
problem—predated MARPOL.107
A comprehensive national or international approach to data security
breaches might even avoid one of the pitfalls that MARPOL and other
international conventions and U.S. environmental protection statutes share
in terms of fixed liability limits that prove very hard to update. For
example, the liability limit in the Clean Water Act was intended to subject
violators to civil penalties in amounts “up to $25,000 per day of violation or
an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil.”108
But regardless of these imperfections, the five pivot points found in
MARPOL, its amendments and IMO regulations as well as U.S.
environmental protection laws offer some useful approaches for data
security spills.
A. COMPULSORY NOTICE OF SPILLS
One of the most useful analogies that payments data security can draw
from MARPOL 73/78 is its requirement of compulsory notice of oil spills
to a central agency.109 There is no de minimus rule in the MARPOL
scheme; that is, the ship’s operators must report every spill or discharge.110
In contrast, enacted state legislation and pending federal bills regarding
data security breaches, discussed infra, only require prompt notice to law
enforcement if the breach affects a threshold number of individuals or
records—such as at least 10,000 individuals or a million or more records,
and separate notices to consumers whose card data has been breached.111 It
106. Id. at regulation 19.
107. See Introduction to IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default
.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2010) (describing the IMO’s origins in 1948 as the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organizations, a name changed to International Maritime Organization in
1982). The IMO entered into force in 1958 just prior to the entry into force of OilPOL. Marine
Environment Pollution Prevention Background, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/Our
Work/Environment/PollutionPrevention/OilPollution/Pages/Background.aspx (last visited Dec.
28, 2010).
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(A) (2006).
109. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11, at art. 8; Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra
note 105, at regulation 37.
110. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11, at art. 8; Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra
note 105, at regulation 37.
111. Nearly every federal data security bill allows delays in notices to consumers so that law
enforcement investigations may take place. E.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221,
111th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (as passed by House, Dec. 8, 2009) (providing delay for regular law
enforcement purposes and for longer periods if notification would threaten national or homeland
security). In both cases, delays must be based on determinations of necessity, and requests for
delays are made in writing. E.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th
Cong. § 311(d) (2009). Additional delays may be requested. E.g., H.R. 2221, § 3(c)(2)(A) (thirty
days original delay for general law enforcement purposes subject to subsequent requests for delay
with no specified outer limit if requests also made in writing).
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is this Article’s position that, in order to protect critical infrastructure assets
and national security, notice between the entity that suffers the breach and a
central authority (at least at the national level) that a payments data spill has
occurred should be mandatory regardless of its size, rather than based on
some threshold. Proprietary payments systems rules and credit and debit
card master agreements should require the merchants, payments processors,
or financial institutions whose systems are breached to notify their counterparties as well, regardless of the number of records or accounts affected.
Thresholds, I would argue, keep from central scrutiny data problems at their
beginning, may allow them to spread, and certainly provide no earlywarning system equivalent of orchestrated attacks on a retailer, payment
system, or financial institution that would protect everyone involved.
B. COMPENSATION FOR THIRD-PARTY LOSSES
MARPOL 73/78 is also part of a longstanding scheme of compensation
for third-party losses that reaches back to 1954, beginning with the
convention known as OilPOL.112 Compensation allows affected
communities and individuals to survive the damage to livelihoods and to
physical environments on which they depend or around which they live.
Since OilPOL, various international conventions and domestic laws
implementing them in some cases have increased the amount of first-level
compensation.113
The group of international conventions providing for compensation
includes two that predate MARPOL 73/78, the 1969 International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (commonly known
as the 1969 Civil Liability Convention), and the 1971 International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (commonly known as the 1971
Fund Convention), each of which has been replaced by new protocols in
1992, now known, respectively, as the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and
the 1992 Fund Convention.114 The 1992 Civil Liability Convention imposes
112. OilPOL, supra note 99. The 1978 Protocol to the 1973 Convention essentially replaced
OilPol. See Background on Pollution Prevention and MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11. However,
Congress then repealed the Oil Pollution Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-167, 75 Stat. 402, which had
implemented OilPOL and the Oil Pollution Act Amendments of 1973. Act to Prevent Pollution
from Ships of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-478, 94 Stat. 2303 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1901–1915).
113. U.S. statutes implemented these compensation schemes to include, inter alia, Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1321 (2006), the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1814 (1988) (repealed 1990), the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (1988), and the Deepwater Port Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1517 (1988).
114. The International Regime for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Explanatory Note
Prepared by the Secreteriat of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, INT’L OIL
POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS (Dec. 2010), http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf
[hereinafter Explanatory Note].
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strict liability on ship owners for oil pollution damage.115 The 1992 Fund
Convention provides supplementary compensation for oil pollution victims
if the former convention’s compensation is inadequate.116 In addition, a
Protocol to the 1992 Fund Convention created a third tier compensation
prospect through the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Supplementary Fund, raising the maximum payable for one incident to
750,000,000 Special Drawing Rights, which is equivalent to
$147,500,000.117
Examples of domestic legislation providing for compensation exist in
the United States and Turkey. In the United States, the OPA specifies the
types of damages that individuals and other entities that suffered injury
could obtain from persons responsible for oil spills.118 These include
damages to natural resources, real or personal property, subsistence uses of
natural resources, revenues, public services, and profits.119 In addition, it
specifies the scope of clean-up costs for which responsible persons are
liable, including containment and actions necessary to “minimize or
mitigate damage to public health or welfare, including, but not limited to,
fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines, and
beaches[.]”120 The OPA allows the States to impose liability on responsible
parties beyond the liability that the Act provides.121 Turkey’s law was
adopted in 2005.122
A special scheme for damages to third-parties—like the overall scheme
supporting compensation for oil-spill victims briefly described above—
might be used to sustain credit reporting blocks or monitoring and recovery
expenses, particularly when breaches affect smaller merchants or
institutions, or other sorts of damages that are hard to quantify in advance.

115. See id.; see also International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
1992, art. 1 ¶ 6, art. 3 ¶ 1, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1993, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255, available at
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf.
116. See Explanatory Note, supra note 114; see also International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, at art.
II, ¶ 1, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1993, 1953 U.N.T.S. 330, available at
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf.
117. Explanatory Note, supra note 114. To determine the daily value of Special Drawing rights
under this scheme, see Exchange Rate Archives by Month, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). For a
comprehensive analysis of the overall oil pollution damages scheme, see MICHAEL MASON,
TRANSNATIONAL COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: EXAMINING CHANGING
SPATIALITIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY (2002), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/570/1/RPESAno69(2002).pdf.
118. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2720, 2731–2738 (2006).
119. Id. § 2702(b)(2)
120. Id. § 2701(30).
121. Id. § 2718(a).
122. For a thorough discussion of this law, see MURAT TURAN, TURKEY’S OIL SPILL RESPONSE
POLICY: INFLUENCES AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/turan_0809_turkey.pdf.
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In establishing a compensation scheme for counter-party and consumer
damages from data spills, however, we should take care to create a
mechanism to provide for periodic increases in basis compensation. This
would avoid the problems associated with compensation schemes in which
allowed damages have not kept pace with inflation, such as in the Death on
the High Seas Act of 1920123 or in 13 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A), which
establishes a civil penalty for “owner[s], operator[s] or person[s] in charge
of any vessel, onshore facility or offshore facility from which oil or a
hazardous substance is discharged in violation of” 13 U.S.C. § 1321(3) that
is capped at $25,000 per day of violation for discharges of oil or other
hazardous substances or at up to $1,000 per barrel of oil or unit of
reportable quantity of hazardous substances discharged.124 In addition, in
cases in which the violation “was the result of gross negligence or willful
misconduct” of an owner, operator, or person in charge described in 13
U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A), the person is “subject to a civil penalty of not less
than $100,000, and not more than $3,000 per barrel of oil unit of reportable
quantity of hazardous substance discharged.”125
In addition, the compensation scheme might reward prompt and
accurate reporting of the data spill to avoid the obvious temptation to
lowball the estimate of damages inflicted. In the Deepwater Horizon
incident, for example, there were many reports that BP was under-reporting
the discharge from the well so that it could take advantage of the “strict
liability” penalties in 13 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A) and avoid the higher penalties
for “gross negligence” provided in 13 U.S.C. § 1321(7(D).126
C. OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS
MARPOL 73/78 imposes additional operational requirements and some
restrictions on tankers and other vessels that do not meet its mandates. For
example, just as VISA suspended RBS PayCard’s approved service
provider status after its breach revealed that its compliance with PCI DSS
was inadequate,127 vessels that do not meet certain criteria under MARPOL
may not enter certain waters or ports,128 and may be required to keep
expanded records and undergo additional inspections.129
This multi-pronged approach to prevention may be more effective than
the single-factor reliance on encryption or double-factor encryption and best
123.
124.
125.
126.

Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302–30308 (2006).
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(7)(A) (2006).
Id. § 1321(7)(D).
John Schwartz, Liability at Issue in Oil Flow Rate in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jul 19, 2010, at
A17; see also Press Release, The Select Committee on Energy, Independence and Global
Warming, Markey: Flow Rate Report Shines Light on BP’s Financial Liability, True Size of Spill
(May 27, 2010), http://globalwarming.house.gov/mediacenter/pressreleases_2008?id=0255.
127. Ashford, supra note 70.
128. Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105, at regulations 20–21.
129. Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105.
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practices approaches seen in state data security breach laws as well as
pending federal legislation.130
D. DOUBLE HULLS AND COMPARABLE SAFE-DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS
MARPOL 73/78 also requires specific structural defenses to guard
against oil spills and other discharges into the sea. For tankers built after
1981, MARPOL requires that construction be double-hulled.131 The
convention requires that vessels with large capacities but built before June
1, 1982 or contracted to be built before that year, be retrofitted with double
bottoms and structural improvements to their sides.132 Vessels without
appropriate structural defenses as required by MARPOL should not expect
access to certain ports.133 Similarly, payments systems participants that
cannot comply with PCI DSS’s required firewalls and 128-bit encryption
security features—or that employ EMV/chip-and-PIN technology instead—
might be precluded or suspended from certain payments systems. Such was
the fate of Heartland after its breach.134
E. MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND AVOIDANCE OF
TRADE-HINDERING NATIONAL LEGISLATION
The fifth lesson that MARPOL 73/78 offers to the solution of payments
data spills relates to its role as a model for international cooperation in the
effort to reduce the temptation to deal with certain issues piecemeal through
national legislation. Because of rising evidence that the perpetrators of data
security breaches operate internationally,135 and because the threat of
transnational criminal prosecution may not deter cyber thieves, international
cooperation through private standard setting and international conventions

130.
131.
132.
133.

See infra Part IV.
Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105, at regulation 20.
Id.
Id. For an analogous situation regarding data breaches, see Ashford, supra note 70
(describing how banks may be removed from Visa’s and Mastercard’s list of validated service
providers if they are not compliant with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard).
134. E.g., Freed, supra note 92 (reporting the suspension of the Heartland system from VISA
participation until it had been recertified); Lemos, supra note 66 (mentioning the use of low-level
thieves called “cashers” to withdraw funds from ATMs in Montreal, Moscow, Hong Kong, and
other cities in the U.S. and abroad depleting 100 accounts and revealing personal information on
1.5 million cardholders and the social security numbers of 1.1 million of them); Robert McMillan,
FTC Says Scammers Stole Millions, Using Virtual Companies, COMPUTER WORLD, Jun. 27, 2010,
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9178560/FTC_says_scammers_stole_millions_using_vir
tual_companies (scammers used U.S. residents to move money to Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Estonia)
[hereinafter McMillan, FTC Catches Scammers]. More recently, reports suggest that Russian
hackers broke into check image depositary and used information to generate counterfeit checks
and stole $9 million. Elinor Mills, Check Counterfeiting Using Botnets and Money Mules, CNET
NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-200111885-245.html.
135. See, e.g., McMillan, FTC Catches Scammers, supra note 134.
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offers an attractive approach for the prevention and resolution of data
security incidents.
III. HOW DO PAYMENTS DATA SPILLS AND MARITIME SPILLS
COMPARE?
Part II of this Article focuses on costs associated with the prevention
and remediation of spills, both payments data and oil-related. This Part
focuses on the causes of spills. In this regard, payments data spills and
maritime accidents share things in common. First, both may derive from
insiders’ negligence or recklessness, or cost-cutting that affects riskprevention measures.136 Examples of negligence leading to data spills
include:
 Theft of unencrypted information on hard drives stored in an
apparently unsecure closet in a training facility of BlueCross
BlueShield of Tennessee. These hard drives contained data, as well
as photos of the screens on which trainees and operators were
working that revealed sensitive personally identifiable information
about customers;137 and
 The spectacular TJX breach affecting 94 million payment records
of credit cards and debit cards involving the use of wireless Internet
transmissions of data vulnerable to interception in a process known
as “war driving” in which thieves use readers to capture
transmissions leaving known store locations.138
Maritime examples include:
 The disarming of one or more warning systems on the Deepwater
Horizon oil drilling platform in the days and weeks prior to the
explosion and spill, and the failure to heed other signals that
important safety features were not functioning as planned;139
 The grounding of the Exxon Valdez in the Valdez Inlet near
Anchorage, Alaska in 1989. Investigation of the cause of the
accident revealed that, despite the known shoal dangers of Prince
William Sound through which the Valdez was moving,140 only one
officer was on the bridge at the time of the accident and that the

136. For a discussion on oil spills, see Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39.
137. See McMillan, Data Theft, supra note 35.
138. Byron Acohido, Cyberthieves Find Workplace Networks are Easy Pickings; Simple
Hacking Techniques Have Potential to Collect Data From Any Entity Using a Digital Network,
USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2009, at B1 (discussing the TJX and Hannaford data security breaches and
the means used to intercept data).
139. David S. Hilzenrath, Alarm System on Rig Was Disabled, Technician Testifies, WASH.
POST, July 24, 2010, at A5.
140. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 38.
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pilot had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
grounding;141 and
 The Cosco Busan accident that spilled 53,569 gallons of heavy
crude into San Francisco Bay on November 7, 2007.142 The United
States filed felony and misdemeanor charges against the Cosco
Busan’s management and pilot for sailing in fog, travelling at an
unsafe speed, failing to make plans or use radar, and falsifying
documents.143
Second, the sources of spills may be entirely different. For example, the
1978 wreck of the Amoco Cadiz was caused by the failure of the tanker’s
steering mechanism and subsequent rough weather, which in turn caused
the tanker to split apart, spilling 68.4 million gallons of oil and despoiling
more than 125 miles of the coast of France.144 This tanker was not fitted
with a double hull—because MARPOL’s requirement was not in effect at
the time—placing its cargo at greater risk in the event of grounding.145
Does the grounding of the Exxon Valdez bear a stronger resemblance to
the BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee spill—which involved unencrypted
data in an unguarded location—or the Google spill—which involved the
high-tech penetrations of significant firewalls around wire transfer
systems?146
While considering the above, it may be helpful to think about the
differences between navigating correctly charted waters, on the one hand,
and navigating areas in which recent storms or sand accretions may affect
the reliability of the charts. Or, in other words, navigating around known
rocks is easier because, normally, big rocks do not move often and sand
does.147 The chart and, therefore, the charted course should be all right if all
one is interested in is avoiding the rocks. But the same won’t work with
sand, which is constantly eroding and accreting.148
141. Stephens, supra note 3; see also ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, supra note 38, at 27.
Among other sea and shore life, the oil spill killed 250,000 sea birds and more than twenty orca
whales in Prince William Sound, Alaska, alone. Joling & Thiessen supra, note 95.
142. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INCIDENT SPECIFIC
PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (ISPR) M/V COSCO BUSAN OIL SPILL IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY: REPORT
ON INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE (2008), available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/CoscoBuscan/Cosco
BusanISPRFinalx.pdf (listing number of birds caught (1,039), cleaned (681), and dead (1,365) due
to the Cosco Butan oil spill and discussing origins of the spill).
143. Bob Egelko, Felony Charges for Ship’s Management, S. F. CHRON., July 24, 2008, at B3.
144. Allen Tony, MV Amoco Cadiz, THE WRECKSITE ARCHIVE (June 26, 2007),
http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?10339.
145. See Background on Pollution Prevention and MARPOL 73/78, supra note 11.
146. More E-Mail Account Details Leak Online, N.Y. TIMES GADGETWISE BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009,
11:05 PM), http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/more-e-mail-account-details-leakedonline/?scp=3&sq=wire%20transfer&st=cse.
147. Interview with Roland Trope, Esq., Partner, Trope & Schramm, LLP, in Coral Gables, FL
(Jan. 25, 2010).
148. Examples of accretions and erosion abound. Storms may cause breaches that radically alter
tidal flows in their vicinities and lesser weather changes may cause significant shifts in sand bars
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But, as new operating systems are rushed to market, data security
confronts efforts by cyber-thieves that are analogous to movements of both
rocks and sand on a constant basis as thieves search for any available
vulnerability and seek to penetrate systems that may have been considered
impenetrable just prior to the breach. So, in some respects, detecting and
preventing risks to data security may be harder than avoiding the
aforementioned types of shipping accidents. However, the risks to critical
infrastructures and national security are such that stronger incentives for
appropriate levels of monitoring and deterrence as well as some legal,
centralized, or collective solutions are needed.
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO DATA SPILLS AND
PROSPECTS—DO PROPOSALS SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESS
SPILL PREVENTION AND DATA SPILL REMEDIES FOR
BUSINESSES OR CONSUMERS WHOSE SYSTEMS OR
PERSONAL INFORMATION IS BREACHED?
A. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
Notwithstanding the numerous data spills and the damages resulting
from them, the only recent federal law specifically related to data breach
notification is the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act).149 The Act expanded the
enforcement jurisdiction of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)150 to allow state attorneys to enforce HIPAA’s
provisions and implementing regulations.151

and shoals that affect tides or otherwise threaten maritime safety. See, e.g., Nelson Sigelman,
Three Years Later, Norton Point Breach Marches On, MARTHA’S VINEYARD TIMES, Apr. 29,
2010, http://www.mvtimes.com/marthas-vineyard/article.php?id=536; Nelson Sigelman, Ocean
Forces Continue to Shape Katama Cut, MARTHA’S VINEYARD TIMES, June 19, 2008,
http://www.mvtimes.com/2008/06/19/news/norton-point-breach.php.
Studies
of
sand-bar
migration include Edith L. Gallagher, Steve Elgar & R.T. Guza, Nearshore Sandbar Migration,
106 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 11,623 (2001); Edith L. Gallagher, Steve Elgar & R.T. Guza,
Observations of Sand Bar Evolution on a Natural Beach, 103 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 3203 (1998);
D.J. Phillips & S.T. Mead, Investigation of a Large Sandbar at Raglan, New Zealand: Project
Overview and Preliminary Results, 1 REEF J. 267 (2009).
149. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115, 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
150. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 16, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
151. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act § 13410(e). Using
this new authority, the State of Connecticut was reported to be investigating the WellPoint data
breach. See Joseph Goedert, Conn. AG Probes WellPoint Breach, HEALTH DATA MGMT (July 6,
2010), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/breach-wellpoint-anthem-connecticut-attorn
ey-general-40596-1.html. Prior to the HITECH Act, only the Secretary of Health and Human
Services could enforce HIPAA’s privacy and security rules. See Priscilla M. Regan, Federal
Security Breach Notifications: Politics and Approaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1111
n.47 (2009) (citing GINA STEVENS & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG.. RESEARCH SERV., R40546, THE
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Congress has been considering additional data security legislation since
at least 2005.152 Thus far in the 111th Congress, the House has passed two
bills—the Data Accountability and Trust Act153 and the Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act of 2010.154 This section looks at those bills, and two
Senate bills introduced in the 111th Congress, to consider whether their
provisions would help or hinder the deterrence and resolution of payments
data spills. It also discusses H.R. 1319, the Informed P2P User Act, and S.
3027, a companion bill to H.R. 1319, which was introduced in the Senate in
February 2010.
Each of these bills would impose new requirements on the handling of
financial account data that is among the most valuable data for data thieves
to access. Each bill only attempts to address a segment of a total data
security scheme. For example, the Data Accountability and Trust Act
directs the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate regulations to require
owners and possessors of electronic data containing personal information
and engaged in interstate commerce to provide for security procedures,
vulnerability testing, and proper disposal of data, and requires notification
of data security breaches to the FTC and to affected individuals.155 The
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act focuses on the creation of strategic plans
and support for research in the data security field, and requires the National
Science Foundation to recruit for and fund a scholarship program for
professionals in this field.156
As a result, merchants, payments processors, and operators of payments
systems will be subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999 (GLBA) and the Fair and Accurate Transactions
Act (FACTA) requirements, and “data brokers” may be subject to new
statutes such as the Data Accountability and Trust Act.157 Of course,
providers of consumer financial services and products are already governed
PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROVISIONS FOR HEATH INFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN RECOVERY
AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009, at 18 (2009)).
152. Beginning in the 109th Congress to early March 2010, numerous bills dealing with data
security from different perspectives have been introduced in the House of Representatives. See
generally Legislation in Current Congress, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, www.thomas.gov (last visited
Dec. 28, 2010). Among these were Consumer Notification and Financial Data Protection Act of
2005, H.B. 3374, 109th Cong. (2005) and the Consumer Data Security and Notification Act of
2005, H.B. 3140, 109th Cong. (2005), from the Committees on Banking and Financial Services
and on the Judiciary, respectively. For an excellent history of Congress’ interest in breach
notification legislation, see Regan, supra note 151, at 1112.
153. Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 8,
2009).
154. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010, H.R. 4061, 111th Cong. (as passed by House,
Feb. 9, 2010).
155. H.R. 2221 §§ 2–3.
156. H.R. 4061 §§ 103, 106.
157. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601).
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by Title V of the GLBA.158 S. 1490 creates enforcement mechanisms for
violations of its own requirements,159 and it authorizes the FTC to
promulgate regulations to implement its privacy and data security
requirements.160 In addition, the Senate bill confirms the role of the United
States Secret Service as the primary federal agency to be notified of data
security breaches161 and strengthens the tools that the federal government
may use in combating such breaches.162 It does not expand remedies for
consumers, largely because error resolution for unauthorized transactions
should be covered by rights available to them under laws governing other
payments system rules including the Fair Credit Billing Act163 for credit
card transactions or the Electronic Fund Transfer Act for debit and payroll
card transactions.164 However, it leaves consumers affected by data spills
affecting bank and other transaction accounts, including gift cards, without
a specific remedy.
1. Bills Passed by the House of Representatives
The House of Representatives has passed two data security bills since
the beginning of 2009. These bills are:
a. H.R. 1319
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 1319 on December 8, 2009;
it requires P2P providers to disclose to users which files a P2P program can
share and consent of the users before the files can be shared over that
program.165 The bill also makes it unlawful for any entity covered by its
provisions to prevent an owner or authorized user of a protected computer
158. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 301 (as reported
by S. Comm., Nov. 5, 2009) (exempting financial institutions regulated under GLBA from S.
1490). S. 1490 also would not apply to entities governed by HIPAA. Id. (exempting HIPAAregulated entities from S. 1490).
159. Id. § 101 (“Organized criminal activity in connection with unauthorized access to
personally identifiable information”); id. § 102 (“Concealment of security breaches involving
sensitive personally identifiable information”); id. § 104 (“Effects of identity theft on bankruptcy
proceedings”); id. § 202 (FTC enforcement powers against data brokers); id. § 303 (FTC
enforcement of requirements for privacy and security of personally identifiable information
programs); id. §§ 317–18 (enforcement by state and federal Attorney Generals of breach
notification requirements).
160. Id. § 202.
161. Id. § 316.
162. Id. §§ 101–02, 202, 302, 317, 318.
163. Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301–08, 88 Stat. 1500 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
164. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2001, 92 Stat. 3728 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2006)).
165. Informed P2P User Act, H.R. 1319, 111th Cong. (2009). Section 2’s requirement of notice
prior to installation or downloading of a P2P program or activation of a file-sharing function of
such a program does not apply to pre-installed software or to software upgrades. Id. § 2(a)(2)
(“Non-application to pre-installed software”); id. § 2(a)(3) (“Non-application to software
upgrades”).
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from: (1) using “reasonable efforts” to block installation of a file-sharing
program or function if covered by the bill; and (2) “having a reasonable
means to” disable covered file-sharing programs or removing file-sharing
programs that the covered entity caused to be installed or induced another
person to install.166 The bill grants authority to the FTC to enforce its
requirements making failure of the provider to comply the equivalent of a
violation of a rule defining unfair or deceptive acts or practices under
§ 18(a)(1)(B) of the FTC Act.167 The bill also authorizes the FTC to
promulgate rules to accomplish its provisions.168
b. H.R. 2221—The Data Accountability and Trust Act
Section 2 of the Data Accountability and Trust Act instructs the FTC to
promulgate regulations to:
[R]equire each person engaged in interstate commerce that owns or
possesses data containing personal information, or contracts to have any
third party entity maintain such data for such person, to establish and
implement policies and procedures regarding information security
practices for the treatment and protection of personal information taking
into consideration—
(A) the size of, and the nature, scope, and complexity of the
activities engaged in by, such person;
(B) the current state of the art in administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards for protecting such information; and
(C) the cost of implementing such safeguards.169

One of the problems with H.R. 2221 is its safe harbor from liability for
encrypted data because encryption alone170 is unlikely to sufficiently protect
data from all hacking. Rather, it is the bundle of physical, administrative,
and technical safeguards—which include but are not limited to encryption
efforts—that are more likely to yield comprehensive protections. The
incident at BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee discussed supra
demonstrates how easily data may be stolen, particularly in large quantities,
if more than one of the three forms of protection is not in use.
With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 in July 2010, it is unclear whether the
rulemaking authority that H.R. 2221 granted to the FTC will remain there

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. § 2(b).
Id. § 3.
Id. § 5.
Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (as passed by House,
Dec. 8, 2009).
170. Id. § 3(f)(2)(A).
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or will transfer to the newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection.171
c. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010, H.R. 4061
On February 4, 2010, the House of Representatives passed the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010. The Act, among other things,
encourages social and behavioral research in cybersecurity,172 provides for
sponsorship of the development of scholarship and funding for training,173
and encourages development and promotion of international cybersecurity
technical standards and an “identity management research and development
program.”174 If enacted, this bill is likely to encourage, in many respects,
new approaches to deterrence and more cooperation on spill prevention.
2. Bills Considered by the Senate
The Senate has considered numerous bills since January, 2009. The
following sections consider them in detail.
a. S. 1490—The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of
2009
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary found that 9,300,000 individual
records pertaining to personal payment transactions were compromised in
2008.175 Based on this finding, the Committee reported out S. 1490, the
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009. Its provisions cover
consumer access and correction rights to information held about them by
“data brokers.”176 Data brokers are entities that collect and sell commercial
data, including personally identifiable information, to others, including
governments.177 This bill resolves gaps left between the GLBA and FACTA
safeguards and disposal rules178—and indeed by HIPAA179—because
entities already subject to those statutes and regulations would not be
171. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
172. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2010, H.R. 4061, 111th Cong. § 104 (as passed by
House, Feb. 4, 2010).
173. Id. § 106 (“Federal Cyber Scholarship for Service Program”); id. § 107 (requiring an
analysis of and recommendations for securing an “adequate, well-trained Federal cybersecurity
workforce”).
174. Id. § 202 (development and promotion of “International Cybersecurity Technical
Standards”); id. § 204 (“Identity Management Research and Development” program).
175. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 2 (as reported by
S. Comm., Nov. 5, 2009).
176. Id. §§ 201–04.
177. Id. § 3(5) (defining “data broker”).
178. Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records, 16 C.F.R. 682 (2006). This rule
implements provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681w (2006).
179. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 16, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
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governed by S. 1490.180 Three key features of the bill require data brokers
who collect or maintain records pertaining to 10,000 or more individuals to:
(1) have privacy and security programs;181 (2) audit and update those
programs;182 and (3) notify the United States Secret Service in the event of
data security breaches if the number of individuals whose personal
information is obtained without authorization exceeds 10,000 or if a
database or network containing 1 million or more individual records is
breached.183 A separate requirement to notify individuals whose personally
identifiable information is involved in the breach is excused if the data
broker’s risk assessment pertaining to that breach concludes that:
(A) there is no significant risk that a security breach has resulted in, or will
result in, harm to the individuals whose sensitive personally identifiable
information was subject to the security breach, with the encryption of such
information establishing a presumption that no significant risk exists, or
(B) there is no significant risk that a security breach has resulted in, or will
result in, harm to the individuals whose sensitive personally identifiable
information was subject to the security breach, with the rendering of such
sensitive personally identifiable information indecipherable through the
use of best practices or methods, such as redaction, access controls, or
other such mechanisms, which are widely accepted as an effective
industry practice, or an effective industry standard, establishing a
presumption that no significant risk exists[.]184

b. S. 139—The Data Breach Notification Act
S. 139, the Data Breach Notification Act, is a narrower bill than S.
1490. It does not impose the same requirements for new privacy and
security programs that S. 1490 imposes and its requirements for notification
of individuals by “data brokers” after a data breach also are narrower.185 S.

180.
181.
182.
183.

S. 1490.
Id. § 302.
Id. § 302(e).
Id. § 316. Notice to the U.S. Secret Service by entities experiencing data security breaches
is limited to cases in which 10,000 individual victims may be involved or to cases in which a
database or network is involved that contains information about one million individuals or more.
Id.
184. Id. § 312(b)(1) (emphasis added).
185. S. 139’s Sections 5 and 6 use a threshold for notices required to cases involving 5,000 or
more individuals. Data Breach Notification Act, S. 139, 111th Cong. §§ 5–6 (2009); see also id. §
3(b)–(c) (safe harbor presumptions). However, Section 7 is similar to S. 1490 in that it requires
notice to law enforcement only if the Serial Peripheral Interface Bus (SPI) of about 5,000 or more
individuals is believed to have been acquired or the affected database or integrated databases
contain SPI for one million or more individuals. See id. § 7.
For S. 1490, Title II’s provisions on notice to affected consumers in Sections 311 and 312
do not contain the threshold that Sections 5 and 6 of S. 139 do. See id. §§ 311–12. Title III’s
Section 316 contains similar threshold to S. 139’s Section 7 on notice to law enforcement—a key
weakness in both bills. See id. § 316. However, Title III’s Section 302 contains much stronger
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139 allows a complete defense to liability in enforcement actions brought
for violations of its requirements if the data is encrypted or the database
follows “best practices.”186
c. S. 773—The Cybersecurity Act
S. 773, the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, takes a very different approach
from the other bills discussed in this part of the Article. It focuses on the
development by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
of standards for federal government agencies’, government contractors’,
and grantees’ “critical infrastructure information systems and networks.”187
It also envisions financial assistance to create and support regional
cybersecurity centers to assist small and medium-sized businesses.188
Among many other provisions, it also places NIST in the position of
representing the United States in international cybersecurity standards
development projects,189 makes the Department of Commerce (Commerce)
the clearinghouse for all “cybersecurity threat and vulnerability
information,”190 and grants the Secretary access to data regardless of “any
provision of law, regulation, rule or policy restricting such access.”191 The
bill also authorizes the President to declare a “cybersecurity emergency”
and to “‘order the limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any
compromised Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure
information system or network.’”192

provisions on the scope, design, assessment of and periodic reassessment of protocols designed to
protect SPI, and also on training of personnel to protect SPI. Id. § 302.
186. See S. 139 § 3(b)(2)(A)(B).
187. Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 6 (2009).
188. Id. § 5. S. 773 does not reach depositary institutions or providers of securities and
insurance products. Jurisdiction over depositary institutions is with the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Committee Information, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
CommitteeInformation.Jurisdiction (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
189. S. 773 § 6(a).
190. Id. § 14(a).
191. Id. §§ 6, 14. The breadth of this authority would allow the Secretary of Commerce to avoid
the requirements of the Federal Right to Financial Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2006),
and of other federal pro-privacy protections in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681(u)–(v) (2006), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006), and
the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006). In the absence of restrictions such as these, the
government could obtain any information that an individual voluntarily gave to a third-party or
that resulted from their transactions.
192. See S.773—Cybersecurity Act of 2009, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org
/bill/111-s773/show (last visited Aug. 29, 2010) (citing S. 773 § 18(2)); see also James Corbett,
The Rising Tide of Internet Censorship, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=17433 (reporting, among other things,
the finding in conjunction with the bill’s introduction in 2009 that “‘voluntary action is not
enough’” to manage cyber security threats) (citation omitted).

2010]

Payment Data Security Breaches and Oil Spills

141

d. S. 3027—The P2P Cyber Protection and Informed User Act
S. 3027, the P2P Cyber Protection and Informed User Act, is a
companion bill to H.R. 1319, which was introduced on February 23,
2010.193 Its substance is identical to that of H.R. 1319, described in Section
IV.A.1.a of this Article, supra.194
B. STATE LEGISLATION
While the federal government has been trying to enact and consider
data security bills, at least forty-six states, and the District of Columbia,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted
some form of data security breach notification requirements.195 One state
has enacted a provision that requires retailers whose conduct causes
payments data spills to compensate the parties with whom they have
dealt,196 and a second is considering imposing a statutory contributory
negligence standard197 as well as a fund to which merchants would
contribute on a per-transaction basis to manage compensation for victims of
payments data security breaches.198
1. General Observations on State Data Security Breach Laws
State law requirements that make vendors liable to financial institutions
for breaches of unencrypted credit and debit card payment transaction data
could make a big difference in the overall integrity of the payments system.
To date, only Minnesota has enacted legislation that creates incentives to
deter breaches in this manner.199 The Minnesota law requires the use of
PCI,200 the only state to do so. It also imposes liability on merchants for
data security breaches.201 The forty-five other states that have required
breach notices to affected consumers create incentives for stronger
193. P2P Cyber Protection and Informed User Act, S. 3027, 111th Cong. (as introduced, Feb.
23, 2010).
194. Id.; see supra Part IV.A.1.a.
195. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489 (last modified Apr. 12, 2010). For an excellent
discussion of the variables in state data security laws, see G. Martin Bingisser, Note, Data Privacy
and Breach Reporting: Compliance with Various State Laws, 4 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 9
(2008), available at http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol4/a09Bingisser.html (written when
about half the states had enacted data security breach notification laws).
196. MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 Subd. 6 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 8.31 Subd. 3 (2009).
197. 2010 H.B. 1149, 2010 Leg., 61st Sess. (Wash. 2010).
198. An earlier version of Wash. 2010 H.B. 1149 contained the authority to collect the two-cent
fee to establish the fund. Data Security: Amended Bill Assigning Payment Card Breach Liability
Passes Washington House, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 94, at 429 (Mar. 2, 2010) [hereinafter
Amended Bill Passes WA House].
199. § 325E.64; see also James T. Graves, Note, Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on the
Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1117,
1132 (2008).
200. § 325E.64.
201. Id. Subd. 3.
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technical, administrative, and physical safeguards for payments data by
requiring notice to all consumers whose personally identifiable information
has been released in a security breach.202
But each state’s laws vary slightly, and many employ subjective or
objective thresholds before action is required. For example, Washington’s
statute relieves an individual or entity from the duty to disclose the breach if
the breach “does not seem reasonably likely to subject customers to a risk of
criminal activity.”203 Virginia’s standard is both objective and similarly
subjective; disclosure of the breach is required if:
[I]nformation is accessed and acquired in an unencrypted form, or if the
security breach involves a person with access to the encryption key and
the individual or entity [suffering the breach] reasonably believes that such
a breach has caused or will cause identity theft or other fraud to any
resident of the Commonwealth.204

Reliance on the subjective assessments of the entity suffering the
breach may be likely to produce too little notification and, therefore, too
little customer or public pressure to reform data security practices.
State data security breach laws often do not provide much in the way of
direct redress for consumers whose payments transaction data is
compromised. For example, the Indiana security breach statute does not
create a private right of action for consumers.205
Other state proposals use high thresholds, such as the restriction in H.B.
1149 in Washington limiting its application to businesses and government
agencies that process 6 million or more payment card transactions in a
year,206 and also (perhaps incorrectly) exempts businesses or agencies from
liability provisions if they are in compliance with PCI DSS207 (because
compliance ends when a breach is demonstrated). The varied requirements
of these state laws undoubtedly have contributed to the numbers of data
security bills introduced in Congress, as interstate companies work to
preempt with inconsistencies across states. 208
State breach notification statutes may be seen by some as comparable to
the outbreaks of “domestic legislation” that from time to time propelled

202.
203.
204.
205.

See, e.g., id. Subd. 3(5).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(d) (West 2010) (emphasis added).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(C) (West 2010).
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) (adding that the Indiana
statute “imposes no duty to compensate affected individuals for inconvenience or potential harm
to credit that may follow”).
206. See Amended Bill Passes WA House, supra note 198.
207. Id.
208. Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, Much Ado About Notification: Does the Rush to Pass
State-Level Data Security Regulations Benefit Consumers?, REGULATION, Spring 2006, at 44, 49–
50, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv29n1/v29n1-5.pdf.
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amendments to MARPOL’s requirements.209 The varying compliance
responsibilities of separate state laws and their costs likely draw funds210
and energy away from technical innovations aimed at overall safety goals.
In the data security context, however, the willingness of states to enact data
security breach laws has had the benefit of “increase[ing] the visibility” of
data security.211
C. NOVEL STATE PROPOSALS TO REDRESS OR DETER PAYMENTS
DATA SECURITY BREACHES
H.B. 1149, the bill that the Washington legislature passed,212 originally
suggested two new means of redressing liability. First, it made vendors that
sell payment card processing software and equipment contributorily liable
for breaches caused by faults in their software or hardware.213 Also, it
allowed merchants to charge two cents per transaction to offset the costs of
the insurance merchants would have to cover their liability to financial
institutions should data that merchants retained be breached.214 Only the
former of these made it though Washington’s House of Representatives.215
The bill also prohibits merchants “from retaining credit card security code
data, PIN codes or verification numbers, or the full content of ‘magnetic
stripe data’ after authorization of a transaction without the express consent
of customers.”216 In addition, it makes retailers liable for breaches of
retained payment card data if the breach affected 5,000 or more
unencrypted individuals’ names or account numbers, as long as the business
or agency processes 6 million or more payment card transactions per
year.217 This provision is unique in that it limits liability to cases in which
the breach reaches a threshold number, as opposed to the more standard
numerical trigger for notices of the breach to consumers. If this provision is
209. See, e.g., Maitland, supra note 102, at 52; Senator Lautenberg—Naval Architect?, MARINE
LOG, Apr. 2008, at 14 (describing the October 2006 amendments to MARPOL and the notion that
if the International Maritime Organization moves in “too ‘reasonable’ [a manner] it may not fend
off unilateral action by individual countries”).
210. Caroline Stenman, The Development of the MARPOL and EU Regulations to Phase Out
Single Hulled Oil Tankers 8, 23–24 (May 2005) (masters thesis, Goteborg University School of
Economics and Commercial Law), available at http://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/1941/1/2005
56.pdf (explaining how unilateral EU action spurred adoption of stricter MARPOL guidelines,
phasing out single-hulled ships more quickly); see generally Michael E. Porter & Claas van der
Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. OF
ECON PERSP. 97, 113–14 (1995); Roy Rothwell, Industrial Innovation and Government
Environmental Regulation: Some Lessons From the Past, 12 TECHNOVATION 447 (1992).
211. Graves, supra note 199, at 1116.
212. 2010 H.B. 1149, 2010 Leg., 61st Sess. (Wash. 2010), amending WASH REV. CODE §
19.225.RCW (2010).
213. Id. § 3(b).
214. Amended Bill Passes WA House, supra note 198.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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enacted, it could establish a precedent of non-liability for breaches affecting
only smaller numbers of individuals, which would not create incentives for
stronger data security.
V. ARE “SAFE HARBORS” OR PRESUMPTIONS BASED ON
ENCRYPTION OR OTHER SECURITY METHODS
APPROPRIATE?
As mentioned above, some of the data security bills pending in
Congress provide exemptions from requirements to notify individuals
whose personally identifiable information may have been affected by the
data security breach if the holder of the information has had the data
encrypted or subject to some other security methods. In some cases,
exemptions are possible based on encryption alone. This approach is used
in Ohio, West Virginia, and Virginia.218 In other cases, use of encryption
alone is sufficient to establish a presumption that there is no significant risk
that personally identifiable information was exposed in the breach.219
Encryption alone does not prevent attacks: data in the Heartland breach was
encrypted at the store, but apparently not in transmission.220
In early 2010, at a lecture on encryption given by Indiana University
School for Informatics Professor Steven A. Myers,221 I asked a question
about basing a “safe harbor” for data security on encryption alone. The
reaction by the Informatics faculty and graduate students in the room was
immediate and visceral: their jaws dropped. Their ensuing remarks made it
clear their collective belief that encryption alone should not suffice to
qualify for a safe harbor. Rather, they preferred a combination of encryption
218. Many states create safe harbors by defining personal information as unencrypted and
readable data elements. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12(A)(6)(a) (West 2010). Other
states create safe harbors by defining a breach as “unauthorized access and acquisition of
unencrypted and unredacted data.” W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-101(1) (2010). Others create
explicit safe harbors. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(C) (West 2010).
An individual or entity shall disclose the breach . . . if encrypted information is
accessed and acquired in an unencrypted form, or if the security breach involves a
person with access to the encryption key and the individual or entity reasonably
believes that such a breach has caused or will cause identity theft or other fraud to any
resident of the Commonwealth.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(C).
219. Several states define “significant risk” as excluding the breach of encrypted data. See, e.g.,
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3(a) (2010) (“Any state agency or person . . . shall disclose any breach
of the security of the system which poses a significant risk of identity theft . . . to any resident of
Rhode Island whose unencrypted personal information was [breached] . . . .”).
220. See Heartland Hacker Gonzalez Pleads Guilty to Compromise of Over 170 Million Cards,
ATMMARKETPLACE.COM (Sept. 14, 2009), http://atmmarketplace.com/article.php?id=1131
9&na=1 [hereinafter Heartland Hacker Pleads Guilty].
221. Steven A. Myers, Lecture at the Maurer School of Law, Indiana University: One Bit
Encryption (February 16, 2010). For the text of the paper on which this lecture was based, see
Steven Myers & Abhi Shelat, Bit Encryption Is Complete (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
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and “best practices” involving administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards. Dr. Meyers and others in that audience also noted that the value
of encryption also depends to some extent on the portions of the data and
data transmission to which encryption is applied and the manner through
which the data were obtained. For example, the group of thieves responsible
for the TJX and Hannaford Brothers data spills were engaged in diverse
strategies including one known as “war driving” in which the group
intercepted payments data during transmission over wireless Internet
connections by positioning themselves close to store locations from which
the data were being transmitted.222
VI. ARE RECENT PAYMENTS DATA SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS MOVING CLOSER TO A MARPOL-LIKE
REGIME?
Data security laws in the United States normally do not mandate that a
particular form of data security/anti-fraud process be employed, with
Minnesota’s law as the possible vanguard of a new approach.223 Rather,
existing state laws impose requirements on the owner of data if a data
security breach occurs.224 Thus, the norm is to allow the marketplace to
devise means to protect data so as to avoid the expense and reputational risk
of revealing that a data security breach occurred. This places the
responsibility of protecting data on each entity that holds payments data and
related personally identifiable information. One advantage of this approach
is that there is no single standard method of protecting payments data; the
diversity of approaches serves as a barrier to easier hacking, and there is no
static standard that would require legislative action to amend. However, as
reports of the “iffy decisions” made by BP and its partners in the drilling of
the Deepwater Horizon well show,225 self-driven risk assessments in highly
competitive environments may result in the commitment of too few
resources to disaster prevention.226
Payments systems and others could create more incentives for users to
keep up-to-date in deploying new security. They could, for instance, require
software developers to warrant their programs (as discussed in subsection A
below) or could push towards adoption of more secure technologies (as
discussed in subsection B).

222. Indictment at 4–5, United States v. Albert Gonzalez, No. SBK/EL/2009R00080 (D. N.J.
2009). Gonzalez has since pled guilty to identity theft, wire fraud, computer fraud, and conspiracy
in Massachusetts and New York, though charges are still pending in New Jersey. See Heartland
Hacker Pleads Guilty, supra note 220.
223. Graves, supra note 199, at 1117.
224. State laws typically impose duties to disclose and/or compensate after a breach has
occurred. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.11.2, 1798.29(a) (West 2007).
225. See Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39.
226. See Stephens, supra note 3.
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A. SECURITY BASED ON SOFTWARE & WARRANTIES
Beyond requirements for prevention of payments data spills that are
comparable to MARPOL’s, some commentators have suggested that we
should use different methods to make payments systems software less
susceptible to hacking, including for example by requiring providers of
software and database operators to warrant their products or their services
to end users. Two of the proponents of specialty payments data warranties
are Roland Trope227 and Professor Juliet Moringiello.228
Warranties are a common way to manage externalities and to overcome
asymmetries in information between manufacturers and providers of
services and their customers.229 Warranties in sales transactions include
express and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose, as well as warranties of good title and quiet enjoyment,
and warranties against infringements of patents and trademarks.230 In the
payments data security arena—as in other vertical manufacturing and
retailing environments—warranties present some attractive market
opportunities for providing remedies if software fail to deliver their
promised results or services do not protect data in transmission or storage.
In 2004, Roland Trope argued for the creation of a software “limited
cyberworthiness warranty” based on the doctrine of seaworthiness.231 He
made two observations that bear upon both the focus of this Article and his
cyber-worthiness proposal. First, he explained that common law in the
United States treats ships as “unseaworthy when [they are] ‘insufficiently or
defectively equipped.’”232 He also observed that “[c]ourts have come to
regard the seaworthiness of a ship as analogous to a warranty.”233
As Mr. Trope conceives of this new limited warranty, its target is the
capacity of a software “application’s capabilities to protect confidential
information from unauthorized access from, or disclosure to,
cyberspace.”234 He proposes that such a warranty might require that:
227. Roland L. Trope, A Warranty of Cyberworthiness, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Mar./Apr.
2004, at 73 [hereinafter Cyberworthiness].
228. See generally Moringiello, supra note 12.
229. See Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting,
77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 29, 42 (2001).
Contractual provisions, typically representations and warranties, serve to credibly
communicate information, chiefly to rebut the presumption of undesirable attributes
which divergent interests inspire and information asymmetry makes possible. They
provide a means for one party to signal to the other the absence of undesirable attributes
and presence of desirable attributes.
Id.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

U.C.C. §§ 2-312–315 (2003).
Cyberworthiness, supra note 227, at 73–74.
Id. at 74 (citing Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 726 (1967)).
Id. at 74 (citing Brister v. A.W.I., Inc., 946 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1991)).
Id. at 73.
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Prior to the software’s release, the maker subjected [the software]
to rigorous tests to verify its degree of security against intrusion by
unauthorized persons, electronic agents, or code (that is, it verified
its cyberworthiness).
By the time of release, the maker [should have] removed all known
critical security vulnerabilities found in the software. (I define
“critical” as any vulnerability that, if exploited, would enable
unauthorized access to confidential information or unauthorized
control of a user’s computing device.)
After release, the maker shall continue to diligently probe the
software for security vulnerabilities.
When the maker learns of a critical vulnerability, it will
immediately email all high-priority customers, describe the problem
in detail, and provide suggestions for a temporary solution—
disabling features, and so on—to diminish or limit the vulnerability
until the maker can provide a patch. (“High-priority customers” are
those likely to have valuable confidential information at risk in
systems linked to cyberspace. To become such a customer, the
party would enter into a written agreement with the software maker
that any vulnerabilities disclosed and patches released to it would
be kept confidential to prevent hackers from gaining early
knowledge of such vulnerabilities. These customers would pay an
increased purchase price in exchange for the incremental increase
in protection.) The vulnerability notice also would include
information that would alert users to take additional precautions to
safeguard their confidential information until they had received a
security patch.
Immediately after creating a vulnerability security patch, the maker
would email it first to the high-priority customers and, after an
interval, to all registered software users.
When distributing a security patch, the software maker shall not
attach to it any disclaimer as to the accuracy of information
provided with the patch or its fitness for correcting the specified
security vulnerability. . . .
The software’s warranty will be valid for a period of three years
from the release date. (A security patch or newly marketed software
should be warranted for a period comparable to that covered by the
computing device’s warranty. It should be a period long enough to
earn a user’s trust. . . .
The warranty would be valid for purchasers who buy directly from
the maker and for those who buy from third-party sellers, but
[whose purchaser is] still in the direct chain of distribution from the
maker.

148

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 5



The warranty would prescribe precautions to which purchasers
must adhere, such as “do not open unknown attached files in emails
from unknown senders.” Purchasers who violate the precautions
(and suffer or cause harm) void the warranty, and will not be
entitled to damages from the maker.
 If the maker breaches the warranty, the purchaser (buyer or
licensee) is entitled to an expeditious remedy of a liquidated
damage in an amount and through a procedure specified in the
warranty . . . .235
Mr. Trope also proposes that this cyber-warranty be “phased in . . . with
the first security-patch release.”236 In addition, he suggests that warrantors
“would offer only the portion of the proposed warranty that applies to each
patch.”237
Professor Moringiello urges a warranty like the homeowners’ warranty
(HOW) that first became popular in the late 1970’s.238 She analogizes to
early warranties created by law in which courts were unwilling to allow
injured end users no remedy as against a provider with superior knowledge
and the ability to control the end product through contract and preventive
measures.239 Although courts have been far more reluctant to create
warranties in the data security arena, the theories undergirding early
common law warranties and the original common law homeowners’
warranties240 may apply with equal force to payments data security.
To allay payments-related data security concerns, the United States and
others will need to employ both MARPOL-based approaches and
warranties such as Trope’s phased-in cyber-worthiness warranty and
Moringiello’s HOW-like proposals. PCI DSS—a certification process based
on technical standards241—represents a significant advantage in protecting
the whole electronic payments data chain, but problems nevertheless have
arisen within systems that recently had been judged PCI DSS compliant.
For example, Hannaford Brothers apparently met credit card industry
security standards prior to breach but was still vulnerable to hacking.242

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Moringiello, supra note 12, at 80–82.
Id.
See id.
For a description of the PCI DSS standards as well as the opportunity to download them,
see PCI SSC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml (last visited Dec. 30,
2010).
242. See Ross Kerber, Advanced Tactic Targeted Grocer ‘Malware’ Stole Hannaford Data,
BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2008, at 1A (noting that Hannaford met standards set by VISA, Inc. and
other card companies but that these were not sufficient to avoid the breach, explaining that the
breach was attributable to that which analyst Steve Rowen described as “‘markedly more
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B. SECURITY BASED ON THE CARDS THEMSELVES OR ON THE CARD
AND THE CARD AUTHENTICATION PROCESS:
More recent payments security advances include “chip-and-PIN”
systems associated with the Europay, MasterCard, and VISA (EMV)
system. EMV generates transaction data from the “card authentication
[process] and from the cardholder verification processes” the issuer may
employ.243 Deployed in the EU, Canada, and Asia beginning in 2004, and
mandatory in the UK beginning in 2005, chip-and-PIN technologies offer
more protections against hacking.244 For example, in the first year of its
deployment in the UK, chip-and-PIN technology contributed to a 13 percent
decline in card fraud in Britain.245 However, as a “skimming” fraud246
aimed at Shell oil stations in the UK in 2006 demonstrated, for cards that
contain magnetic stripes as well as EMV/chip-and-PIN technology, even
EMV is not fail-safe.247 And, as Jane Adams reports, thieves can still
perpetrate “card-not-present” frauds by bypassing the chip or magnetic
stripe.248
Despite the issues with these technologies, EMV/chip-and-PIN
technologies offer more advanced anti-fraud approaches, including the
ability to “identify fraud patterns and credit risk situations” by comparing
data gleaned from the current transaction to data from prior transactions.249
However, EMV technology has been slower to gain traction in the United

sophisticated,’” and reporting that the hackers “mined a stream of data that merchants and banks
were not responsible for protecting under industry rules”).
243. Jane Adams, Dynamic Risk Management with EMV Data, ACI WORLDWIDE, July 2006, at
1, http://surveycenter.tsainc.com/pdfs/3065%20EMV%20flyer.pdf (citing Michael Hendry, a
payments consultant who helped implement EMV systems in the EU).
244. See, e.g., Fed Official Warns Card Fraud Threat Growing in U.S., COLLECTIONS &
CREDIT RISK (July 27, 2010), http://www.collectionscreditrisk.com/news/fed-official-warns-cardfraud-threat-growing-3002682-1.html (citing Richard Oliver of the Atlanta Federal Reserve
Bank’s Retail Payments Risk forum advocating for shift to EMV smart-card technology to thwart
fraud rings and criminals used in Europe, Canada, and other regions of the world); Fitzgerald,
supra note 41 (describing phase-in deadlines for EMV technology in Canada and liability
increases for merchants that have not deployed it on schedule); Brian Ooi, The EMV Migration
Path in the Asia Pacific Region, FROST & SULLIVAN (Aug. 25, 2005), http://www.frost.com/prod/
servlet/market-insight-top.pag?docid=46281303; Vijayan, supra note 80.
245. Adams, supra note 243, at 1.
246. See Petrol Station Worker Admits Credit Card Fraud, NORTHAMPTON CHRON. & ECHO
(U.K.), Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.northamptonchron.co.uk/news/Petrol-station-worker-admitscredit.5156481.jp.
247. Adams, supra note 243, at 1.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2. Adams reported that information stored on the card and capable of being passed
back through EMV includes information relevant to prior efforts to misappropriate the card and
the authorization process such as evidence that data authentication, script processing, or
authorization request cryptogram verification has failed. Id. Card data also would show repeated
uses at untended terminals. Id. Some of the data that the card can send pertain to offline
transactions, which Adams reported are “particularly prone to fraud.” Id.
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States250 than in Europe251 and the absence of EMV chips is an obstacle to
U.S.-based consumers using their cards for international travel.252 Among
the issues that may work against broader-scale deployment in the U.S. are
the costs of the readers253 for EMV cards and concerns that full-deployment
of the cards featured could implicate privacy concerns.254
CONCLUSION
The cost and extent of payments-related data security breaches have
been rising in the United States.255 Legislation to curb data security
breaches and to enhance enforcement of federal laws that have emanated
recently from the Committee on the Judiciary in the House of
Representatives and the Senate Committees on the Judiciary, Homeland
Security, and Commerce, Science and Technology offer promise. These
bills are steps in the right direction but they still suffer from the
jurisdictional limitations under which the Senate Committees in particular

250. See Chips Cards in the U.S., THE NILSON REPORT ISSUE 930, at 6 (July 2009) (explaining
most U.S. issuers will have EMV-compliant chip cards available by the end of 2010 with plans to
market them to upscale frequent international travelers). The slow adoption of chip-and-PIN
technology has made it harder for individuals with credit cards issued in the U.S. to use them
abroad. See Michelle Higgins, For Americans, Plastic Buys Less, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at
TR3 (explaining that 22 countries including “much of Europe, Mexico, Brazil, and Japan, have
adopted the technology” and that another 50 countries are “in various stages of migrating to the
technology in the next two years, including China, India, and most of Latin America”). In
addition, Ms. Higgins reported that as Canada deploys this technology issuers there “plan[] to stop
accepting magnetic stripe debit cards at A.T.M.s after 2012 and at point-of-sale terminals after
2015.” Id. For more information on Canada’s movement to chip-and-PIN technology, see
Canada’s Migration to Chip, EMV CANADA, http://www.emvcanada.com/merchant_documents/
background.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). EMVCanada is a web site provided by ACT Canada,
a non-profit organization, to provide a neutral forum for consumers, merchants, and the media to
learn and share information related to secure payments. Id.
251. See Brandon Glenn, Visa Hopes European Unit Can Give More Flexibility to Customers,
IRISH TIMES, May 7, 2004, at 58 (discussing the introduction of chip-and-PIN systems throughout
Europe).
252. EMV Chip Cards Expected for Upscale U.S. Cardholders, SMART CARD ALLIANCE,
http://www.smartcardalliance.org/resources/pdf/EMV_Cards_Issued_in_US.pdf (last visited Sept.
22, 2010).
253. See Dan Balaban, Turning the Corner, CARD TECH., Nov. 1, 2005, at 42 (reporting on the
slow roll-out of readers across Europe).
254. Adams, supra note 243, at 2–3 (discussing the capacity to build a “detailed user profile”).
Chipped cards are capable of holding significant amounts of personal data, such as passport and
driver’s license information, health records, and medical histories. See Fundamentals of EMV
Chip: The Next Revolution: The Payment Environment Is Quickly Changing. Are You Ready to
Make Contact in this Brave New World?, INSIGHTS, Winter 2006, at 4, available at
http://www.mastercard.com/ca/wce/PDF/14049_Insights2006-Fundamentals-EN.pdf [hereinafter
Fundamentals of EMV Chip].
255. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 23, at 4. For a more comprehensive discussion of
card payment fraud, particularly its potential for damage and increases in fraud, see Richard J.
Sullivan, The Changing Nature of U.S. Card Payment Fraud: Industry and Public Policy Options,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., 2Q 2010, at 101.
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operate.256 These jurisdictional limitations caused the current gaps in data
security left by GLBA,257 FACTA,258 and HIPAA.259 Thus, the more recent
bills described in this paper—apart from S. 773—focus on “data brokers,”
commercial entities whose primary role is to collect and sell posttransaction information including personally identifiable information, as
opposed to persons who themselves engaged in transactions with consumers
whose personal and account information is the target of thieves or those
already are governed as “consumer reporting agencies” by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and FACTA.260
These bills will impose on data brokers particular federal requirements,
but will leave them unconnected legally to end users, that is, the consumers
or businesses whose transaction information they have obtained will still be
without legal recourse against the entity that was holding their data at the
time of the breach.261 For this reason, the lack of a unified regulatory regime
operating on an end-to-end basis leaves the door open to future database
hacking because of decisions such as that by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club,
Inc.262 Moreover, Congressional bills, such as H.R. 2221 and S. 1490,
which grant a safe harbor from prosecution for violations of their
requirements, including the requirement to notify affected individuals if the
data are encrypted or the entity uses other “best practices” to bolster the
benefits of encryption, are likely to leave a lot of account data and other
personally identifiable information without sufficient protection.263
256. For example, it apparently is much more difficult in the Senate to take up a subject or to
propose a law governing an industry that lies partly in the jurisdiction of another committee. Thus,
each committee drafts legislation uniquely aimed at solutions to issues within its own purview,
often leaving associated issues unresolved for jurisdictional reasons. Senate Committees, U.S.
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Committees.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2010).
257. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
258. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952.
259. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 16, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
260. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2006).
The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person which, for monetary fees,
dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information
on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which
uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or
furnishing consumer reports.
Id.

261. See supra text accompanying notes 149–194.
262. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. 918 N.E.2d 36, 46–47, 50–51 (Mass.
2009).
263. See Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3 (as passed by House,
Dec. 8, 2009); Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 311 (as
reported by S. Comm., Nov. 5, 2009).
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The current enacted and proposed legislation addresses many of the
similarities between data spills and maritime accidents. But, unfortunately,
many of our data security efforts to date seem to miss the most critical
distinction between legal schemes for the prevention of pollution from
maritime accidents and other legal prevention schemes: that paymentsrelated data security breaches are different from the hazards of maritime
activities. It is important to remember Roland Trope’s highly useful
observation that it is easier for ships to avoid encounters with charted rocks
and shallow waters than with shifting sand bars.264 The former do not move.
Sand bars move, and their movement may be accelerated by storms and
other weather conditions. But even sand bars are better known risks than
data-security attacks. Sand bars and other natural maritime risks move
much less frequently and normally with more predictability than does the
capacity, indeed the determination and artistry, of individuals determined to
penetrate databases or to intercept real-time exchanges of payments-related
data.
Maritime accidents fall into two categories—collisions between two
ships, or accidents involving the oil-and-gas exploration or the operation of
deepwater ports, which are primarily the result of operator negligence, on
the one hand, and groundings or collisions with rocks, sand bars and shoals,
and other inherent sea hazards.265 Payments data security breaches seem
more closely associated with the former category because cost-cutting and
inadequate risk assessments by private actors contribute to disasters with
broad-reaching implications, as the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill
tragically demonstrated.266 But payments-related data spills are even harder
to prevent because, unlike events caused by storms, negligence, or merely
bad choices, data security breaches are perpetrated by determined
individuals who are constantly exploring new methods of getting access to
data and systems they need to engage in crimes. Thus, in payments-data
security, the “terrain”-based threats seem to be subject to even more
constant changes than are sand bar risks to maritime activities.
Like MARPOL and the associated compensation conventions—such as
Civil Liability 1992 and Fund 1992, and their predecessors267—we should
make data protection a dynamic process that receives persistent attention,
specifically by rethinking and restructuring it as new means of safeguarding
against data protection penetration as administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards come into being. Encryption is one of the technical safeguards
264. Interview with Roland Trope, supra note 147.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 139–146; see also Graham Mapplebeck, Int’l Mar.
Org., Navigational Safety and the Challenges of Electronic Navigation (Feb. 14, 2008) (transcript
available at https://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D21091/Navigation
alsafety.pdf).
266. See Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 39.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 98–133.
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that should be part of this process, but it alone is insufficient to protect data,
counter-parties, or consumers.
Moreover, despite traditional and appropriate reluctance in this country
to require that certain technologies be employed, developments elsewhere
may make the use of specific technologies, comparable to the double-hull
requirement in MARPOL,268 mandatory. For example, with EMV
increasingly in use in the EU and Canada, it may only be a matter of time
before EMV is more widely used here by credit and debit card issuers.
However, while EMV technologies can contribute to greater fraud
prevention, they do not yield 100% protection from fraud269—and their
protection may come at the price of consumer/user privacy.270
Third, despite the widespread damage that a maritime accident may
create, the causes and effects of data spills are much less localized than the
effects of typical maritime accidents. Data security breaches of a system in
one part of the world—such as the penetration of Royal Bank of Scotland’s
WorldPay system and the rapid subsequent withdrawals at ATMs in fortynine countries271—affect payments systems in other parts of the world.272
Fourth, Congress and the states have crafted legislation that addresses
consumer concerns more than actual prevention of payments data spills.
With the exception of S. 773, the other bills discussed in this Article require
consumer notification once the spill has occurred if the owners’
assessments of the number of consumers affected exceed specified
thresholds and also address certain limited law enforcement concerns.273
But they generally leave risk-assessment and choices of administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards for systems and data to the private actors
involved.
Consumers in a breach-prone environment are a lot like birds, fish, and
other animals whose habitats are affected by spills of hazardous substances
they did not cause. They often lack the ability to protect themselves.
However, in the data security environment, consumers with access to
information concerning data spill events may be better able to thwart
additional damages to their financial well-being such as identity theft and
credit-rating damage. However, at this time in the United States, as
268.
269.
270.
271.

Revised Annex 1 of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105.
Adams, supra note 243, at 1.
Fundamentals of EMV Chip, supra note 254, at 4.
See Part I.A.1; see also Ashford, supra note 70; Espiner, supra note 65; Lemos, supra note

66.

272. Lemos, supra note 66 (persons acting in concert with the hackers were located in fortynine cities around the world and accessed roughly 130 ATM’s in their respective areas to carry out
the last phase of this payments fraud). In the longer-standing attack announced by the FTC in
February, the perpetrators used multiple command and control centers around the world to
manage their money movements. Robert McMillan, SEC, FTC Investigating Heartland After Data
Theft, PCWORLD (Feb. 25, 2009, 6:10 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article
/160264/sec_ftc_investigating_heartland_after_data_theft.html.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 163–198.
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described in this Article, there is no standard requirement for disclosure,
and in some states disclosure is limited to large-scale data spills, such as the
6-million-payments-card processed-per-year threshold in Washington
State’s H. 1149.274 Even consumers who might consider switching to new
providers or to other retailers after a data-spill event affected their former
provider or favorite grocery chain, there are few guarantees that the security
systems that their new providers employ are any less vulnerable to a breach
than their former providers’ systems were.
Similarly, some data spills cause other providers’ systems to become
infected, in a manner like Deep Water Horizon or the Exxon Valdez in
which oil spread away from the primary location.275 Accordingly, entities
that own or possess payments data should receive legal or other financial
incentives to employ ever-strengthening administrative, technical, and
physical protections for data related to consumer deposit accounts, credit
cards, debit cards, and other prepaid cards, as well as for other types of
financial accounts such as insurance and securities. And there should be
adequate legal consequences of failing these duties to maintain adequate
safeguards beyond those already codified such as the rules implementing
GLBA, FACTA, and other federal statutes and rules, including appropriate
private rights of action provided by relevant federal statutes or fines as the
OPA allows.276
As EMV/chip-and-PIN technologies deploy around us,277 they probably
will become the standards for retail payments security. EMV and PCI DSS
are different solutions to these issues, employed in different nations, to
protect the integrity of card-based payments. EMV and PCI DSS represent
different philosophies for providing protection on the order of MARPOL’s
double-hulled ship scheme. However, employing some security technology
such as EMV imposes a real trade off in the form of privacy, because the
technology can retain more information about purchasing habits than other
card systems retain on the card itself.278 This does not present the same
types of concerns in Canada or the EU as it may in the U.S. because of the
restrictions on trading the types of information that EMV technologies and
other payment card transactional records may contain. This concern would
grow larger if legislation such as S. 773 is enacted because it grants openended access to information to the Secretary of Commerce, without mention
of any restrictions on retention or other use of the information unconnected
with prosecution and resolution of the data security breach.279 Thus, it could
274. 2010 H.B. 1149, 2010 Leg., 61st Sess. (Wash. 2010), amending WASH REV. CODE §
19.225.RCW (2010).
275. See supra Part III.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 42–55.
277. Deployments in Canada and Mexico are considerably ahead of deployment in the U.S. See
EMV Chip Cards Expected for Upscale U.S. Cardholders, supra note 252, at 1 n. 5.
278. Fundamentals of EMV Chip, supra note 254.
279. See Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 14(b) (2009).
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enable a vast warehousing of payments transaction data by Commerce
without protections already applicable to other government data requests or
collection.280
Among the solutions discussed in this Article, the types of cyber
warranties that Mr. Trope and Professor Moringiello have advocated are
attractive so long as they cannot be disclaimed, depriving end users and
consumers of their protections. New data security warranties could be
enacted at the state level, or by Congress, or could form part of a
MARPOL-like multilateral approach with its prescriptive regulation of
aspects of accident prevention and intentional shipping discharges of oil
and other pollutants—such as its double-hull and operational requirements,
as well as its additional operational requirements or “penalties” on ships
that do not comply.281 MARPOL’s requirement of notice of spills and
discharges to a central agency is similar to proposals in Congress that
require notice to the U.S. Secret Service.282 Notice allows a government
authority to monitor recovery processes and to coordinate law enforcement
resources as needed.
However, in terms of compensation for victims of shipping spills and
discharges and oil-and-gas exploration accidents, neither MARPOL nor the
Oil Liability provisions of the Clean Water Act offers optimal solutions for
the payments data security breach arena for at least two reasons. First,
unlike shipping or exploration events that are unlikely to repeat themselves,
payments data breaches may recur or thieves may use and/or resell the
information they obtain. Second, once liability limits are enacted in statutes
or agreed to in treaties or conventions, they are difficult to raise.283
Enabling stronger deterrence of, and finding means of resolving
payments data security breaches when they occur, is vitally important to the
integrity of the payments system and to individuals’ trust of it. We should
strive for more seamless recovery methods than are currently available in

280. Id. (“The Secretary of Commerce—(1) shall have access to all relevant data . . . without
regard to any provision of law, regulation, rule, or policy restricting such access.”).
281. Revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, supra note 105.
282. Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 316 (as reported by S.
Comm., Nov. 5, 2009); see also S. REP. NO. 111-110, at 5 (2009) (“[T]he bill also requires that
business entities and Federal agencies notify the Secret Service of a data security breach within 14
days of the occurrence of the breach.”).
283. E.g., Mailtland, supra note 102, at 51. As an example of how long a ceiling or floor stays
in a federal statute, consider the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693r (2006). Since its
original enactment in 1968, it has exempted transactions in which the total amount financed
exceeds $25,000. Id. § 1603(3); see also id. § 1601. Certainly, $25,000 bought a lot more in 1968
than it would today. In the oil spill context, Senator Lautenberg of New Jersey has introduced
legislation that would phase out federal liability limits for oil spills from single-hulled tankers and
raise liability limits for oil spills overall. See, e.g., Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-241, 120 Stat. 516, § 603. For additional discussion of Senator
Lautenberg’s efforts, see Senator Lautenberg—Naval Architect?, supra note 209.
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the U.S., through regulatory or private litigation.284 The movement from a
private claims process conducted by BP for persons whose employment
was adversely affected as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to a
federal claims czar overseeing the claims—such as Kenneth Feinberg’s
Deepwater Horizon and 9/11 Claims processes285—suggests a model for
claims resolution outside the court system at the election of the claimant.286
Such claims processes are particularly important in cases in which there
may be thousands of similarly situated claimants as well as those cases in
which the claimant is unlikely to be able to access the technical expertise
necessary to pursue his claims apart from the option of class actions. A
rigorous claims procedure also would protect the entity experiencing the
breach in the same manner that the alleged tortfeasor is protected by the
“economic loss doctrine” barring recovery to claimants that cannot
demonstrate actual damages.287
Payments data security is increasingly vital to the economy and to
national security. After the 2010 Cyber Shock Wave simulation,288 the
former director of the National Security Agency during the Clinton
Administration argued that the government needs more capacity to deal
with cyber security events and strategies as well as the ability to work
cooperatively with the private sector.289 Only two of the federal bills
analyzed in this Article—H.R. 2221 and S. 773—address strategic
payments and non-payments security issues, such as malicious and strategic
cyber attacks on infrastructure in the payments, utilities, and
telecommunications areas in the U.S. This is accomplished through their
grants of authority to order sequestration of systems that are compromised
or that threaten other systems and infrastructures.290 We also may need to
impose stronger requirements on companies who have had more than one
data security breach, such as ChoicePoint. And, finally, we can hope that
284. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007); Cumis Ins.
Soc’y, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 36, 46–47, 50–51 (Mass. 2009) (denying
recovery on a third-party beneficiary basis).
285. See Matthew Jaffe, Ken Feinberg Named BP Oil Spill Escrow Pay Czar, ABC NEWS, June
17, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/bp-gulf-oil-spill-ken-feinberg-appointedhead/story
?id=10933766; see also Laurel Brubaker Calkins, BP Spill Claims Process Inadequate, Too Slow,
Fishermen Tell Federal Judge, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-05-21/bp-spill-claims-process-inadequate-too-slow-fishermen-tell-federal-judge.html;
Leigh Coleman, BP Stalls Payments to Oil Spill Victims: Feinberg, REUTERS, July 24, 2010,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66N15020100724.
286. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, Deal is Reached on Health Care Costs of 9/11 Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at A1 (describing option to pursue individual claims in court, which few
heirs of the victims of the 9/11 attacks took).
287. See, e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 498–99 (1st Cir. 2009);
Banknorth, N.A., v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283, 286–87 (D. Me. 2005).
288. See Mike McConnell, To Win the Cyber-War, Look to the Cold War, WASH. POST, Feb.
28, 2010, at B1.
289. Id.
290. Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 18(2), (6) (2009).
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multilateral organizations in the payments industry can play a stronger role
than they have so far in framing for payments data protection functional
equivalents of MARPOL’s double-hulled vessels and other operational
restrictions.
With the growing evidence of the cross-border implications of data
spills, we would also do well to consider the benefits of international
cooperation—recognizing, as Melissa Hathaway, former acting senior
director for cyberspace for the National Security and Homeland Security
Councils did, that the U.S. “‘cannot succeed in securing cyberspace if it
works in isolation.’”291

291. Steve Rangor, Cyber Security: War Games or Mission Impossible?, ZDNet (Apr. 27,
2009), http://www.zdnetasia.com/cybersecurity-war-games-or-mission-impossible-62053582.htm
(quoting Hathaway’s speech at the 2009 RSA Conference in San Francisco).

